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Hospitals play many roles in a city: alternately, they may be caretakers of the sick,
economic engines, intellectual hubs, major employers, and neighbors. This last role has
evolved greatly over the last 45 years. The relationship between hospitals and the
communities in which they are located has been affected by constantly changing
economic, political, and social factors. During the early days of urban renewal in the
1950s and early 1960s, large teaching hospitals in Boston experienced a surge of political
and economic power that allowed them to expand with few constraints, often to the
detriment of their residential neighbors. Today, the same hospitals must broker complex
deals with their neighbors if they wish to expand, offering up a host of community
benefits. The process by which the hospital-community power dynamic has evolved has
been shaped by the mediating entity of the Boston Redevelopment Agency, which is in
turn influenced by the Mayor's Office in Boston. Despite their many roles in the city, it is
their sheer physical presence that drives hospitals' relationships with their neighbors. The
health care and employment benefits they can provide are not major bargaining chips in
disputes over expansion; the important considerations are the tangible elements of power
- money and land. The primacy of physical presence as a relationship driver can be
illustrated by the differences in the negotiation process that hospitals directly bordering
residential communities and extending into them experience, as opposed to hospitals that
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Hospitals and health care centers represent an enormous and growing sector of the United
States economy. In 2003, health care expenditures made up 15 percent of the United
States GDP, and that number is expected to rise even further in coming years, reaching
16 percent in 2005. [1] Compared to other industries, health care weathers economic
cycles well. During recessions and in depressed communities, the health care sector can
become the primary local employer. Health care and hospitals are a crucial stabilizing
force in the American economy. This economic strength is accompanied by significant
political power at the local level. In many urban areas, teaching hospitals associated with
prestigious universities are especially looked to as economic drivers. Many cities have
pinned their hopes for the economic future to the field of biotechnology. Much
potentially profitable biotechnology research by definition must be associated with
clinical research facilities, usually a teaching hospital. It is these large urban research and
teaching hospitals that I seek to explore in more detail.
Much like other institutions, hospitals impose certain negative externalities on
surrounding residential neighborhoods. They can create traffic and parking congestion;
create noise from ambulances and helicopters; manifest urban design that is out of scale
with the neighborhood; create physical barriers for residents; and drive up rents in the
vicinity as hospital employees pursue local housing. Moreover, research hospitals have a
tendency to expand, and when they do, they may eliminate beloved neighborhood
4institutions or even their neighbors' homes. This last issue of institutional expansion on
the part of research hospitals is the focus of my thesis.
Alongside these negative impacts, hospitals, unlike many other institutions, are uniquely
poised to extend significant benefits to their communities. They often provide relatively
well-paying jobs across a wide spectrum of educational levels. Their health care facilities
may be the only ones to which the underinsured have access. Their facilities may become
informal community centers in neighborhoods where public spaces are not readily
available. Progressive hospitals that interpret their mandate to provide "health care"
liberally implement a host of neighborhood services that directly or indirectly improve
public health, from basic health education to charter schools or homeownership
programs.
Among hospitals, teaching and research institutions often magnify both positive and
negative effects. Some academic medical research centers are multi-building complexes
spanning many city blocks and spreading deep into residential neighborhoods. They have
access to public and private grants for biomedical research, and their budgets often reach
hundreds of millions of dollars, which can support extensive community benefit
programs. If the relationship between hospitals and the communities surrounding them is
viewed as a tradeoff between negative and positive effects, this tradeoff is magnified in
large research hospitals. It is also constantly in flux; because of their technical needs, they
must undertake new construction and renovation projects from time to time, which
change their physical footprint in the neighborhood. It logically follows that an increase
in a hospital's negative impact on a neighborhood be accompanied by an increase in the
benefits it offers. Indeed, an intricate and ritualized system of bargaining a hospital's
right to expand against increased benefits to its neighbors has emerged. This bargaining,
whether it happens directly, through conflict, or through a government agency, is an
ongoing, evolving process.
Thus, given the dynamic relationship between teaching hospitals and their surrounding
communities, these institutions provide an ideal vehicle for pursuing my research
question:
How have the negotiations' between hospitals' physical expansion and their
community benefits changed from the height of the urban renewal movement to the
present day, in both process and content?
To answer this question, I explored the recent history of two hospital complexes in detail,
both surrounded by residential neighborhoods in Boston, Massachusetts. These case
studies were the Tufts-New England Medical Center, which is located in Boston's
Chinatown, and the Longwood Medical Area, which is surrounded by the Fenway and
Mission Hill neighborhoods. I found that their physical development since 1960 was,
indeed, inextricably linked to their relationships with their surrounding communities.
To better understand how hospital-community relationships have changed over the years,
I sought to understand why. Thus, I examined how the social and economic environments
of different eras influenced the expansion-benefits negotiation, and I found that a third
major player was involved: Boston's municipal government, in the form of the Mayor's
Office and the Boston Redevelopment Agency (BRA). A new factor that the City must
consider is that the overall mission of hospitals is perceived as one of greater good to
Before delving further into their stories, I must explain the use of the word "negotiation" in this thesis.
There are many ways that hospitals and communities have interacted so that a final plan for expansion and
community benefits has resulted. Sometimes this is conflict; sometimes both parties expressing their
desires to a governmental third party that mediates; and sometimes through actual conversations between
hospital administrators and community representatives. Sometimes all parties are happy with the results,
and sometimes they are not. I refer to all these interactions as "negotiations" in the broad sense of the word,
even when the form they take is not as straightforward as two parties wrangling with each other at a
business meeting.
society. This "mission" card is one that many institutions can play, but few with
hospitals' compelling capacity to quite literally save lives. The city, the hospitals, and the
neighborhoods were engaged in a complicated and shifting trilateral balance of power. In
my investigations, I paid especially close attention to whether the unique benefits
hospitals can offer their communities as health care centers influenced this process over
the years. Did the health care and jobs offered by hospitals play a significant role in the
expansion-benefits negotiations, or were hospitals' relationships with their communities
essentially the same as those of other institutions?
I was fortunate to find a large body of information about the dynamic relationship among
hospitals, communities, and government regulators, and how it is negotiated in response
to periodic expansions and other events. The histories of these case studies are rich and
emblematic of the Boston zeitgeist at many points in recent history. Using my case
studies, I will show that, because of changing economic and political environments,
periods of expansion have indeed become concurrent with large increases in hospitals'
community benefits over the past 50 years.
Research Genesis and Methodology
My interest in this topic stemmed from the implications of the institutional sector,
especially health care, as it becomes more and more prominent in American cities. Little
has been written about it recently at the local level, and institution-neighborhood
dynamics are not well understood. Because institutions can be such a powerful force to
benefit or detract from neighborhoods, however, greater knowledge about the power
dynamics of their external relationships is an important goal. To this end, my thesis will
explore the histories of two case studies and their interactions with surrounding
communities in detail, tracing the historical patterns of physical growth and community
benefit programs and the negotiations between the two.
The first case study, Boston's Longwood Medical Area (LMA), is a 213-acre grouping of
hospitals and educational institutions, including Harvard Medical School, the Harvard
School of Public Health, and the Harvard School of Dental Medicine. The LMA abuts the
dense residential neighborhood of Mission Hill, and it is separated from its other
residential neighbors in the Fenway by the parkland of Boston's famous "Emerald
Necklace". The boundaries between the LMA and surrounding communities are fairly
sharply delineated, and its institutions have instituted major community benefits as well.
These include a job-placement program and financing for affordable housing
development through linkage funds extracted by the City.
My second case study is the Tufts-New England Medical Center (T-NEMC), a tightly
packed 11-acre area interwoven with the dense surrounding Chinatown neighborhood,
which has resulted in a close-knit relationship between the hospital and community. In
response, T-NEMC has offered substantial community benefits, making the building of
affordable housing feasible and financing a new YMCA.
In the course of my research, I interviewed hospital and university employees,
community organization leaders, an employee of the multi-hospital consortium MASCO,
and a representative of the Boston Redevelopment Agency. I also interviewed players in
the past struggles between hospital and community to get an accurate historical picture.
Finally, I gathered data through primary source research, finding newspaper and
magazine articles and other archival materials like maps and plans.
Some disadvantages are associated with the method of using just two case studies. I do
not have the breadth or sample size to make solid generalizations about hospitals in
general and their relationships with surrounding communities, nor can I perform
statistical analysis of the relationships. The depth of data I was able to collect by focusing
exclusively on two cases, however, paints a nuanced picture that is invaluable for
understanding the complexity of hospital-community relationships. These two case
studies represent a solid beginning for understanding this topic.
On some level at least, the data I have collected speaks for itself; it tells a fascinating
empirical story of how hospital-community relations have evolved over the years. The
parallel evolution of both case studies demonstrates how the negotiating process has been
influenced by similar dynamic external factors. To delve beneath their surface, however,
I also analyzed the case studies through the lens of social conflict theory. I drew on the
work of Richard Senett and Lewis Coser to discuss the ways in which conflicts are
necessary to solidify and maintain social order. In the context of hospital-community
relations, conflict has proven necessary to bring the power equilibrium among hospitals,
communities, and the city into balance when external conditions change. Even today, I
will argue, an unspoken contentious relationship lies beneath the cordial surface relations
among the players and is necessary for maintaining what orderliness exists in the hospital
expansion-community benefits negotiation.
Initial Research Findings
The story of the hospital-community relations and the hospital expansion-community
benefits negotiation can best be told through the shifting relationships among the triad of
entities mentioned above: hospitals, communities, and the city. The connections between
these players waxed and waned, as did their power relative to one another. At the advent
of urban renewal, the communities had very little power, and Boston's Mayor's Office
and BRA had allied itself with the city's institutions and large redevelopment projects in
general. Hospitals, then, could essentially do as they pleased. This period lasted from the
mid-1950s to around 1965.
An era of conflict followed between 1965 and 1985, as community groups arose to fight
bitterly against institutions that were expanding into their neighborhoods. Hospitals could
no longer purchase land and develop it as they pleased with impunity. The BRA
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gradually evolved into a mediator, and then as a strong advocate for the neighborhoods, a
role it retains today. Finally, the relationship between hospitals and community groups
evolved as well, becoming less contentious over the years and more businesslike.
Today the relationship between them appears quite cordial. If they are not directly
adjacent to each other, hospitals and community groups tend to interact minimally with
each other, and the formal negotiations over expansion happen between institutions and
the BRA. If they do lie directly next to each other, hospitals and neighborhood groups
interact more directly and substantially, but the discourse of confrontation has evolved
into one of seeking mutually beneficial solutions to expansion-related disagreements.
Conflict was not only the medium of negotiation for many years; it also shaped the power
balance among the players. Specifically, when hospitals pushed too hard against the
neighborhoods and the city, overreaching the bottom line of what they would accept in
terms of hospital development, they were forced to retreat at great expense. The expense
could be in terms of project delay or in enormous future concessions. Therefore, hospitals
eventually learned not to push as hard for expansion. Hospital-community conflict shaped
the discourse of the expansion-benefits negotiation, changing the parameters of what was
acceptable on the part of hospitals and what was expected on the part of neighbors. Even
today, it is the potential for such conflict that keeps hospital-community relations cordial
and stable. Community organizations in Chinatown, Mission Hill, and the Fenway wield
a great deal of political clout in Boston, and hospitals could find themselves in trouble if
these groups decided to wield an all-holds-barred campaign against them. Thus, today,
hospitals accept as a fact of their existence the necessity to bring any expansion plans
before community groups for input and approval. A ritual of community collaboration
has evolved from which hospitals dare not deviate.
Historical events and trends in Boston and the country at large led to these changes. The
macroenvironment that fostered them included the general economy, the health care
economy, social trends, federal legislation concerning urban renewal and health care
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funding, and local political events such as changes in mayoral administrations. An
individual hospital's physical interface with the surrounding community also had a strong
affect on the political relationship with it. Interestingly, the special health care-related
community benefits of hospitals played less of a role than I had anticipated in land use
negotiations. While they may help shape the overall perceptions of neighbors toward
hospitals, they did not carry enough political weight to be leveraged as a negotiating tool.
Instead, negotiations revolved around the tangible elements of power: money and land.
These provided the leverage hospitals needed and organized the story.
Report Structure
Chapter Two of this thesis provides background for my research. It presents a brief
account of urban renewal in Boston, as well as a history of American hospitals from 1900
to 1960, when the events detailed in my thesis begin. Chapter Two also contains a
summary of Lewis Coser's and Richard Sennet's studies on conflict and its positive role
in society. I will later use their work in explaining how hospital-community relations in
my case studies evolved.
Chapters Three and Four present the bulk of my primary-source research, presenting two
detailed case studies: the Longwood Medical Area and the Tufts-New England Medical
Center.
Chapter Five contains a more thorough analysis of hospitals' community benefits
throughout Massachusetts, in order to provide a context for the benefits programs of my
case studies. In Chapter Five, I examine these hospitals' benefits both qualitatively and
quantitatively and present several possible explanations for why these major teaching
hospitals' benefits are different from Massachusetts' hospitals in general.
Finally, my findings are tied together in the conclusions of Chapter Six.
introductIon
1. MASCO and Goody Clancy & Associates, State of the LMA Executive
Summary. 2003, MASCO: Boston.
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chapter 2
background on hospiital-cOmmunitv conflict
A Brief History of Urban Renewal
The history of urban renewal and health care in Boston has dramatically shaped the
relationships between hospitals and communities today. The onset of Urban Renewal in
Boston began in the mid-1950s. Urban Renewal as a phenomenon was driven by the
drastic stagnation of Boston's economy midway through the 20th century. The 1930s had
seen Boston's once-thriving shipping and trade industries on which the city depended
dwindle dramatically. Meanwhile, traditional New England industries like leather,
footwear, and textiles were also fleeing the region and continued to do so into the 1940s.
The Boston area's nascent technology sector could have been reason for hope, but the
majority of these young companies were located far from the city limits along Route 128.
"With old businesses drying up, and with new businesses moving out into the suburbs,
Bostonians became panicky as they anticipated a return to the disastrous conditions of the
Depression era...." writes historian Thomas H. O'Connor. [1, p. 19] City officials and
civic leaders were desperate to breathe new life into the city.
Much has been written about how this spirit of desperation led to the demolition of
Boston's West End. The diverse, working-class neighborhood of 7000 residents was
completely razed with almost no public input to make way for developer Jerome
Rappaport's luxury Charles River Park apartment complex, which city officials hoped
would bring more affluent people to live in Boston. The demolition left many of its
residents rootless and heartbroken as they scattered from the tightly knit community they
had come to rely on. [2]
Little, however, has been written about the relationship between the Massachusetts
General Hospital (MGH), in whose shadow the West End lies, and the neighborhood
itself. According to Herbert Gans's The Urban Villagers, during the period before the
demolition, West Enders tended to feel somewhat distrustful and hostile toward MGH
and to fear doctors and hospitals in general. Erich Lindemann, in "Moving As a Crisis,"
paints a more complex picture: that despite their distrust of and conflict with MGH, West
End residents were closely attached to it, even "dependent" on it. He claims that the
hospital was one of the few institutions with which they maintained personal
relationships as their political power in the city waned. [3]
The MGH-West End relationship also cut two ways during the West End's demise.
Although the literature about the period almost exclusively refers to the Charles River
Park project as the demolition's beneficiary, it can be argued that MGH also benefited
from the clearance, which freed up territory for it to expand and construct parking
facilities. In fact, Gans even posits that many West Enders' suspicions that these benefits
to MGH were a motivating force in their relocation are "essentially accurate". [2]
On the other hand, some MGH employees maintained a loyalty to the neighborhood as it
was before demolition. A dedicated team of researchers led by MGH's Chief of
Psychiatry Service, Erich Lindemann, was at the forefront of documenting the emotional
and psychological fallout of the West End's clearance. Continuing the complex
relationship between the hospital and its former neighbors, Lindemann received a five-
year National Institute of Mental Health grant to establish a Center for Community
Studies at the hospital and examine the mental health effects of forced relocation on the
West Enders. Leveraging the general upheaval surrounding the redevelopment and the
traditional relationship between West Enders and MGH, Lindemann and his associates,
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including Marc Fried, were able to penetrate deeply into a community that had
traditionally been closed to outsiders. [3]
The result of their work, described in Fried's Grieving for a Lost Home, was a disturbing
indictment of the irreversible emotional devastation relocation had inflicted on the West
End's former inhabitants. [4] In fact, Fried and Lindemann showed that the very aspect of
the community that had made it expendable to Boston's leaders - its lower-income
nature, manifested in deteriorating buildings - was tied to a deep dependence for
emotional and material support on large, complex networks of "family and quasi-family
groups" [4] that could not be translated out of the physical space of the West End. Thus,
the destruction of the West End was far more devastating for its working-class
inhabitants than it would have been had it been made up of small, autonomous middle-
class households. Similar inward-looking neighborhoods bore the brunt of hospital
expansion elsewhere in Boston, as described in the case studies of Chapters Three and
Four.
As an aside, Lindemann was prescient enough to note that the traditional distrust of
residents for institutions made the bitter and contentious public meetings that
characterized the early days of public participation natural and to be expected.
"Responsible participation cannot be demanded of people overnight," he says, but
"Meetings at which people shout and get angry with each other . . . may represent a
salutary phase of communal growth, even though they alarm the public and put a severe
strain on the political process." [3, pp. 147-8] This too anticipated the rancorous conflict
between hospitals' master planning efforts for expansion and the public of their
neighborhoods.
Thus, the West End can be seen as a foreshadowing of the complex hospital-
neighborhood relationships that would change so dramatically over the next half of the
twentieth century. Meetings at which people shouted and got angry with each other,
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disturbing as they were, ultimately played an important role in the constant reshaping of
the relationships between hospitals, communities, and the city.
After the West End debacle, two countervailing forces emerged to shape the dynamic
between Boston's large academic research hospitals and the neighborhoods that
surrounded them. The first was neighborhood resistance to urban renewal following the
general horror at what happened in the West End. Many West Enders had never believed
that their neighborhood would truly be demolished until it was too late to stop the
bureaucratic machinery that led to its demise. It would never again be so easy to take
residential land for urban renewal projects, with minimal organized neighborhood
opposition during the planning process. At the same time, the trend toward including an
active community voice in planning was growing nationally. In Boston, this trend was
manifested through the election of Mayor John F. Collins, who ran on a platform
opposing the West End-like excesses of Urban Renewal and served from 1960 to 1968.
Collins appointed the well-known Edward Logue as his BRA director, in order to
implement a more community-oriented version of urban renewal in Boston. [1]
The second emerging force was a dramatic shift of power toward institutions that
accompanied urban renewal. A stagnant urban economy meant that few private
developers were willing to invest in Boston. However, for well-endowed institutions that
were already there, primarily universities and hospitals, investment in their immediate
surroundings was a necessity. The hospital-community conflicts that ensued were a
logical outcome of the rise in power held by these opposing forces.
Institutions were given large incentives by the federal government for major capital
projects. The Hill-Burton Construction Act was passed in 1946, earmarking federal
money specifically for hospital construction; in fact, the Boston Dispensary, the precursor
to the Tufts-New England Medical Center, was the inspiration for the legislation. [5]
In 1949, Congress earmarked money for urban redevelopment via Title I of the National
Housing Act. In the financial logic of urban renewal, if a city created a redevelopment
plan, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) approved it, the
federal government would pay a generous 2/3 of land acquisition and clearance costs.
The municipality paid just 1/3 of these costs. [1] Some institutions also qualified for this
program as redeveloping entities. The institution would cover the city's 1/3, providing a
financial windfall for the city. Hospitals as institutions did not qualify under the original
version of the act, but in 1961, Congress amended it to include them. Moreover, hospitals
and universities did not have to adhere to a rule that stipulated the redevelopment project
must be predominantly residential - and they could even use the funds for land that was
outside designated urban renewal areas within a certain radius. Using the City's power of
eminent domain, institutions could by proxy force surrounding landowners to sell crucial
parcels. [6]
Since 2/3 of Boston hospitals' expansion costs were being subsidized by the federal
government by 1961, it was the interest of Boston officials to encourage hospitals to
expand. The economic development and "renewal" accompanying them came free of
charge to the city and heavily subsidized by the federal government at a time when it was
sorely needed. Essentially, then, the combination of economic stagnation and urban
renewal policies reshaped the political landscape between 1949 and 1961, giving
institutions, including hospitals, a great deal more power than they had held previously.
A Brief History of Hospitals in the Early Twentieth Century
To put hospitals as they existed in 1960 in perspective, it is instructive to recapitulate
their evolution since the turn of the century. The early 1900s marked a dramatic shift in
the principles behind hospitals in the United States. Until the turn of the century, they had
been mainly charitable organizations focused on sheltering and comforting the ill. As
new medical technologies like x-rays and clinical laboratories developed, they soon
became institutions that considered themselves highly scientific and business-oriented.
Curing their patients to full recovery became hospitals' goal, and they began to be
financially supported by charging patients for care. Efficiency and privacy became
paramount in the design of hospitals. They rose to a typical height of six or seven stories
and provided single and double rooms for their clientele instead of wards and pavilions.
By the 1920s, hospitals were competing with one another for patients. [7]
The idea that medical schools should be associated with hospitals where students could
learn clinical skills was also new at the turn of the century, but it gained ground quickly.
Hospitals benefited from being associated with prestigious medical schools and having
students and professors as ancillary staff. They began to improve and expand their
facilities to suit medical schools' needs. Guenter Risse calls hospitals of the 1920s
"economic hybrids, proclaiming a charitable mission while operating like a business."
Health became a commodity, and medicine became fully professionalized through
modern technology and scholarship. [7]
Middle class Americans began to worry deeply about the rising costs of health care in the
mid-1920s, brought about in part by the skyrocketing rate of traumatic automobile
accidents. Economists suggested that the country had simply built too many hospitals
during an era of great enthusiasm for modern health care. By the Great Depression,
hospitals had already been suffering deeply financially. Some began to turn poor patients
away without care. Fortunately, the concept of health insurance was developed in the
early 1930s, and this new industry lifted hospitals from their economic morass. The
advent of workmen's compensation and social security also provided financial relief to
hospitals and ensured that they would be paid for the bulk of the care they provided. [7]
The post-World War II era's general economic boom was accompanied by another
dramatic expansion for hospitals, as well as the professionalization of nurses. New
technologies like EKGs continued to come online. As mentioned earlier, the 1949 Hill-
Burton Act provided federal funds for hospital construction, and Medicare in the late
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1960s was another financial boon for hospitals. Finally, the National Institute of Health
(NIH), which provided grants that could be used for hospital construction and renovation,
grew precipitously. The NIH gave out 624 times as much funding in 1965 as it did in
1945. [7]
Biomedical research and treating patients with rare acute diseases replaced caring for
patients in a local catchment area as the backbone of teaching hospitals. Risse writes,
"Such concentration limited involvement with broader social and economic issues." [7, p.
578] Hospitals also began to select their patients more carefully to align with professors'
teaching and research interests after World War II. Patients began to be used as
experimental subjects. Thus, the movement away from community health care provision
coincided with a period of expansionism for hospitals. The conflicts that resulted were
not limited to Boston but occurred nationally as well. In the 1960s, writes Risse,
"Academic centers nationwide, many located in decaying urban neighborhoods, were
increasingly condemned for employing deceptively expedient methods in procuring real
estate to remodel and expand facilities without considering their impact on adjacent
neighborhoods and infrastructure." [7, p. 585]
This move toward specialized research and away from primary care for surrounding
communities could not have been more poorly timed. Hospitals were flexing the new
power urban renewal conferred on them as institutions and simultaneously ignoring their
neighbors' needs and health. It is difficult to imagine that this change of medical focus
did not contribute to the growing resentment of hospitals in the 1960s. Yet the two
phenomena could not have occurred separately. They both arose from the postwar spirit
of faith in the scientific realm to solve all manner of human problems. Urban renewal was
a way to scientifically reprogram a city to function better, and scientific biomedical
research represented society's great hope against disease. A third health care trend of the
post-World War II period was the rise of patient autonomy, in contrast to the passivity
earlier expected of them. For the first time, doctors' absolute authority was being
questioned - as well as the authority of the medical institutions that employed them.
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Many changes were taking place as 1960 approached. Urban renewal was still a powerful
force in Boston, but the idea of widespread clearance had fallen out of favor. The health
care sector of the economy was booming, and within it, major research and teaching
hospitals were thriving. At the same time, grassroots political organizing was emerging as
a tool for ordinary citizens to attain political power in the context of many different
issues. The confluence of these forces led hospital-community relationships to take on
new and evolving forms, as the following case studies will demonstrate.
Background on the Theory and Practice of Conflict
As a final piece of background material, I would like to write very briefly about the work
of sociologist Lewis Coser, which is highly relevant to this study of hospital-community
relations. Understanding these hospital-community-city interactions requires an
understanding of conflict and its implications on an institutional level. In The Functions
of Social Conflict, Coser makes several critical points. First, he writes that conflict is
necessary for human relations and has many social functions. One of these functions is to
bind groups together against a common enemy; conflict can unite groups or individuals
allied together on one side of a conflict, bringing them closer to one another. [8]
Coser writes that another function of conflict is to establish decision-making processes
and structures in communities. Although it may be a conflict that catalyzes the creation of
these processes and structures, once they are created, they can continue to serve
communities as ongoing institutions. Similarly, conflict can establish or alter a
relationship between two groups by testing the relative strength of two parties. As we
shall see in upcoming chapters, conflict as a generator of processes, structures, and
relationships will be a common theme in the area of hospital-community relations.[8]
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chapter 3
the longwed medical area case study
The Longwood Medical Area (LMA) is an enormous complex of medical and
educational institutions. Its 213 acres contain Boston's second largest employment
cluster, with 37,000 workers. Its hospitals and medical centers include the world-
renowned Brigham and Women's Hospital, Beth Israel-Deaconess Medical Center,
Children's Hospital of Boston, the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, and the Joslin Diabetes
Center. All affiliated with Harvard Medical School, also located in the LMA, these
institutions comprise a biomedical research powerhouse. Greater Boston receives more
National Institute of Health (NIH) funding than any other metropolitan region in the
United States. Over half of Boston's NIH grant money is funneled into the LMA. [1]
Unfortunately, the LMA occupies a somewhat awkward place in Boston's urban fabric.
To travel from the Central Business District to the LMA, one must pass through many
neighborhoods in between. For a major employment and educational hub in Boston, it is
poorly served by transit. Its clearest boundary is the arterial Huntington Avenue, to the
northwest of which lies the LMA, and to the southeast of which lies the tightly knit
residential neighborhood of Mission Hill. The LMA's other boundaries are Francis Street
to the southwest, over which it is gradually encroaching; and the parkland of Boston's
"Emerald Necklace" on its other sides. Please see Figure 1 on page 31 for a map of the
present-day Longwood Medical Area.
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Fifty-five years ago, in 1950, the area was a hodgepodge of schools, hospitals, clinics,
and religious buildings. These institutions responded to the expansion-friendly social
forces of urban renewal (see Chapter Two) enthusiastically, embarking on an aggressive
land acquisition crusade in the 1950s and 1960s. Harvard made its first major move when
it bought a 9-acre former quarry for its medical school. This piece of real estate, known
as the "Ledge" parcel, would be a touchstone in hospital-community conflict for years to
come. It is located across Huntington Avenue and Tremont Street from what was then the
Peter Bent Brigham Hospital. [2] For this and other points of interest in the LMA case
study, please see Figure 2 on page 33.
Until then, Huntington Avenue and Francis Street had been well-defined tacit boundaries
of the LMA. On one side of these streets lay the working-class residential neighborhood
of Mission Hill, and on the other side, the famous medical institutions. At the time, they
included many precursors to today's hospitals: the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, Boston
Lying-In Hospital, Beth Israel Hospital, New England Deaconess Hospital, the Channing
Home Consumptive Hospital, the Baker Clinic, the Massachusetts Home for Aged
Women, the Hospital of the House of the Good Samaritan, and the Angell Memorial
Animal Hospital. Many of these were Harvard Medical School teaching institutions then
as well as now. [3] Two hospitals were also located on top of Mission Hill, in the heart of
the residential neighborhood: the Robert Breck Brigham Hospital and New England
Baptist Hospital. The Massachusetts Mental Health Center (MMHC) was located two
blocks south of Francis Street.
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Harvard Medical School (HMS) continued its land acquisition activities, attempting in
1960 to acquire the square block of houses between Francis Street and the aging MMHC
via the Commonwealth of Massachusetts's power of eminent domain. HMS hoped to
collaborate with the state to construct a new home for the hospital, thereby upgrading its
teaching facilities. Now that Bostonians had witnessed the eradication of the West End
and the very real threat that urban renewal posed to their neighborhoods, however, acts of
eminent domain were received much less placidly than in the mid-1950s. The residents of
Mission Hill had much in common with the people Gans describes in the Urban
Villagers: they made up a tightly-knight working-class neighborhood and depended on
their physical community. Mission Hill residents organized fiercely against Harvard's
proposed taking, and a march of 3000 protesters on the Massachusetts State House in
1960 succeeded in convincing legislators to block the act of eminent domain. [2] Harvard
Medical School was not stymied by the failure of its eminent domain action, however.
Blessed with deep pockets, HMS turned to the private market to facilitate its expansion.
The school began to buy individual properties in the same block it had unsuccessfully
tried to take by eminent domain three years later, in 1963.
Meanwhile, six major Harvard teaching hospitals, including the Peter Bent Brigham
Hospital (PBBH), Robert Breck Brigham, and Boston Lying-In Hospital, began
discussions about merging into a single institution they then called the Affiliated Hospital
Complex' (AHC). As noted in Chapter 2, by the beginning of the 1960s, a research boom
had begun to dominate hospitals' work as they looked inward instead of to their
communities for their mission. By combining their resources, these already prestigious
hospitals would have an even greater competitive advantage. The hospitals would also be
able to share services and save money through economies of scale. [2]
This large consolidated hospital would eventually open as what is now Brigham and Women's Hospital in
1980.
At this point, hospitals held most of the cards. If the relationship between hospital, city,
and neighborhood could be summed up by a circle representing the relative power of the





Figure 3: The hospital-neighborhood-city triad pre-1965
With their vast financial resources and little oversight, hospitals were essentially free to
buy land around them on the private market to expand into as they wished. The hospitals
had no relationship with community leaders to speak of, and the relationship between the
BRA and the neighborhoods was just emerging. Meanwhile, hospitals had many
cheerleaders at the municipal level that saw their expansion as an economic boon to the
city, and those who did not had little precedent to stop it.
Through the mid-1960s, while hospital administrators struggled to agree on a merger and
physical expansion plan, Harvard Medical School nevertheless laid the physical
groundwork for the potential AHC. It continued to gradually buy residential properties
surrounding the medical area, in order to sell them in the future to its teaching hospitals.
When a family vacated a unit, Harvard's real estate agent would often replace its tenants
by renting to a member of the more transient populations of students, young hospital
professionals, and "hippies". Neighborhood and expansion advocates alike also alleged
that Harvard kept its residential property in grave disrepair, anticipating the block's
impending demise. [2] [4]
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The board of the Affiliated Hospital Complex considered four possible sites for the new
hospital: The "Ledge" parcel mentioned earlier, kitty-corner to PBBH; a parking lot two
blocks away from HMS that the medical school had bought from the Archdiocese of
Boston; the PBBH parking lot; and the Francis Street residential block, encompassing the
dwellings of 182 families, which Harvard had gradually bought. [2]
Ultimately, in 1968, three of the original six hospitals 2 that had considered the AHC deal
(Peter Bent Brigham, Robert Breck Brigham, and the Boston Hospital for Women)
announced that together they would build a new hospital complex on the most heavily
populated potential site, the residential block, because of its sizeable area and proximity
to the Medical School and Children's Hospital. [2] Harvard notified the 182 families
living there that they would have to vacate by 1971. The similarities between this
scenario and that of the West End are striking, even ten years later, with one significant
difference: Harvard was forced to buy the land on the private market before evicting the
residents.
The First Hospital-Neighborhood Clash: 1969
Once again, because times had changed since the West End, Harvard's announcement set
off a firestorm of conflict between the medical school and its neighbors. It marked the
beginning of an extremely contentious period. Some Harvard medical students protested
the actions of their own school, most notably at an April 1969 "student strike" at which
students "occupied" University Hall in Cambridge, and they encouraged Harvard's
tenants to organize and resist the University. [2] Not all students and faculty agreed with
the protesters. The preeminent Harvard surgeon and professor Dr. Francis D. Moore
wrote,
2 Note that the Boston Lying-In Hospital and the Free Hospital for Women merged to become Boston
Hospital for Women in 1966.
"All too often protest... seeks to denigrate, rough-up or destroy institutions or people
rather than to accomplish any worthwhile mission with relation to those people or those
institutions. Many had hoped that medical students, somewhat older, somewhat more
dedicated to a mission for the sick, would be more helpful.... Some of the more
concerned medical students have held a steady eye toward the medical mission itself,
undistracted by the clamor of their more vocal fellows, and in so doing they have restored
the faith of the older generation in the motivation and goodwill of the young." [4, p.
1008, emphasis added].
Nevertheless, the student protesters had a marked effect on the Harvard administration,
and they also made a conscientious effort to reach out to the residential population of
Mission Hill. Neighborhood residents, particularly those who lived in the threatened
block, simultaneously began to organize themselves. The community had been divided
along the lines of race and class, as new groups had begun to move into what had
traditionally been a working-class Irish enclave. The threat to their homes spurred
organizers to work toward bridging these divisions. [2] With a common threat in Harvard
Medical School, residents of Mission Hill proved to be a manifestation of Coser's theory
(see Chapter Two) that conflict with an outside enemy can bring groups closer together.
[5] To give a sense of the strength of the conflict, and how long its memory has persisted,
a 1996 Boston Globe article reminded its readers, "The Mission Hill neighborhood was
crushed in the 1960s and 1970s by suburban flight and the expansion of medical and
educational institutions." [6] While the neighborhood may not have been crushed -
indeed, it was able to make a strong fight against the encroaching institution - in the
popular imagination, the battle between hospital and neighborhood was bitter, and
certainly cause for resentment on the part of Mission Hill.
The First Neighborhood Victory
What Harvard wished to take away from this primitive version of "negotiation" with the
community was clear. Its teaching hospitals hoped to expand, displacing 182 households,
and some say they planned to build a facility without the outpatient care facilities that
would serve neighborhood residents. "Tenants found that many of their neighbors shared
the feeling that the hospital would not serve the community....," Waitzkin writes.' [2, p.
1004] [4] To offset the negative effects of its expansion project, Harvard's public plans
for the AHC included relocation assistance to displaced households from the very
beginning, and in May 1969, after the student protest, Harvard upped the ante, offering to
build affordable housing itself. At one point, Harvard announced it would build 1100 new
housing units in the area, 30 percent of them affordable to low-income families. The
university even promised not to engage in hospital construction until the units were
completed. [2] Harvard offered all this even while internal expansion advocates like Dr.
Moore argued that the complexities of acting as a housing provider would distract the
hospitals from their medical missions and ultimately be a disservice to the field of health
care. [4]
Despite Harvard's offer to build 1100 units of affordable housing, which some critics
deemed infeasible, community and student opposition to the originally designated AHC
site did not wane. Projecting costly delays, the AHC board quickly reconsidered its
planned location. When a delegation of neighborhood residents presented a petition
signed by 175 residents who wished to remain in their homes to the Dean of the Medical
School, Robert Ebert, he told them that the AHC's planned site had changed, sparing
their homes from demolition. Finally, in August 1969, the AHC board announced that the
new consolidated hospital would be built on the PBBH parking lot and half of a
residential block, demolishing just one third the number of the homes that would be
destroyed by the original plan. [2] This site had the disadvantage of its small size, poor fit
with the local traffic pattern, and relative distance from Harvard Medical School.
Moreover, Harvard would assist as many families as possible with moving into another
home in Mission Hill by paying for their moving expenses. [4] Harvard also promised to
build replacement housing for displaced tenants on a nearby 10-acre site it owned, which
3 Moore contradicts this assertion, arguing that from the beginning, the hospitals dreamed of establishing a
community-care center.
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later became the Riverway at Mission Park mixed-income housing development. [7]
Thirty years later, William Franklin, a charter member of Roxbury Tenants of Harvard,
told the Boston Globe, "We hadn't any sort of idea we could do it, but we fought
Harvard, and luckily, we won out." [8]
The balance of power had shifted after this tumultuous period. The new political triangle





Figure 4: The hospital-neighborhood-city triad 1965 - 1970
Following the election of John Collins as mayor, The BRA moved away from monolithic
support for institutions under the direction of Collins's appointee Ed Logue. Many
planners at the BRA in the 1960s were idealists who rejected the more brutal elements of
urban renewal. Instead of legal power, the Mission Hill community fought the hospitals
with sound and fury, using public opinion and capitalizing on the fact that many
individuals within Harvard, especially medical students, disagreed with the institution's
actions. Internal dissent on the part of Harvard weakened it relative to the Mission Hill
community. The hospitals were still wealthy and powerful, but the neighborhood had
shown that it could make enough trouble for the hospitals that the institutions would not
always get their way.
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A Shift in Power Away from Hospitals in the 1970s
The economic dominance of research hospitals in the 1960s also began to wane in the
1970s. Although the NIH continued to give out substantial amounts of research money,
its value was diminished by inflation. At the same time, government reimbursements for
Medicare and Medicaid increased, making patient care more lucrative relative to
research. [9]
This shift in power away from research hospitals was accompanied by a shift of power
toward community groups. Mayor Kevin White, who took office in 1968, was a populist
in the style of Mayor Collins and continued to favor individual neighborhood interests.
Equally important was the growing trend of grassroots political organizing. As noted
earlier, in 1969, when Mission Hill residents who lived in the block slated for demolition
were beginning to organize against the AHC, they formed the organization Roxbury
Tenants of Harvard. The group originally formed solely to prevent Harvard-owned homes
from destruction and to obtain better maintenance and service from their institutional
landlord, but it quickly grew in power and still exists today as a landlord itself.
Many nearby community development corporations (CDCs) followed in its wake. In
1973, a group of Fenway residents formed the Fenway Community Development
Corporation (Fenway CDC). The impetus for the group's creation was the Fenway Urban
Renewal Plan, approved in 1967, which included a sizeable amount of clearance in the
neighborhood, as well as the potential for private demolition of housing. Over time, the
mission of the Fenway CDC evolved to include affordable housing development and
advancing its own physical plans for the Fenway. [10]
Mission Hill followed suit in 1975, when neighborhood activists formed Mission Hill
Neighborhood Housing Services to fight institutional expansion and the inevitable
redlining of their homes that accompanied it. Like the Fenway CDC, it has also evolved
to encompass a variety of programs to help people obtain and keep housing.
The fact that these new organizations helped to even out the balance of power between
hospitals and their neighbors did not decrease the animosity between the two groups.
Indeed, it emboldened community members to fight against their powerful institutional
neighbors. "Tension between ... Harvard Medical School and community groups dates
back to the 1970s, when institutional incursion across Huntington Avenue meant war
with the neighborhood," a Boston Globe editorial proclaimed in 1996. [11] Another
Globe article recalled Harvard Medical School as a "neighborhood nemesis" in that era.
[12]
The new reality that hospitals could not act autonomously when making land use
decisions deeply affected their planning ambitions. The federal regulatory landscape was
changing as well, rolling back the powers granted large institutions during the era of
Urban Renewal. Significantly, federal funding for urban renewal projects began to
dwindle in the late 1960s under the Nixon administration. [13] In 1974, the Senate passed
a bill ending Hill-Burton funding for hospital construction and expanding localities'
powers to disallow hospital construction or expansion when a need for additional hospital
beds cannot be demonstrated. [14] The new community organizations, with their political
clout, were helping to turn political will against institutional expansion at the municipal
level. Negotiation with communities, whether directly or through the BRA, had become a
necessity for hospitals wishing to expand. Once again, the power balance among
hospitals, the city, and neighborhoods had shifted:
Hospital
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Figure 5: The hospital-city-neighborhood triad 1970-1985
It is therefore not surprising that in 1977, the LMA institutions and representatives of
Mission Hill signed an agreement that stipulated any institutional development on the
southeast side of Huntington Avenue would require community consent to move forward,
formalizing the de facto situation that had existed for years. [15]
The previous year, in 1976, Harvard Medical School broke ground on two
complementary projects: a controversial diesel power plant that would serve the needs of
many hospitals, located on the corner of Brookline Avenue and Francis Street; and a
building containing 775 low-income apartments.
The housing project, dubbed the Riverway at Mission Park, was far more successful.
Harvard had owned the former House of the Good Shepherd convent site since the late
1960s, originally planning to use it for expansion purposes. Members of Roxbury Tenants
of Harvard (RTH) and Students for a Democratic Society campaigned to make sure that
Harvard would keep its promise from the 1970 AHC deal and develop it for affordable
housing. After three years of negotiations, Harvard gave the land to RTH and put up seed
money to develop the affordable housing project as planned by the non-profit. [8] By
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agreeing to develop the parcel residentially, Harvard tacitly acknowledged that it was
retreating from its expansionist plans of earlier decades; the parcel would never be used
for medical purposes, and the LMA would simply not extend as deeply into Mission Hill
as its institutions once imagined it would.
The diesel-powered Medical Area Total Energy Plant (MATEP), in contrast, was
furiously opposed by neighborhood residents. During the 10-year struggle around it, the
power plant replaced residential displacement as the touchstone of disagreement between
the Harvard-affiliated hospitals and their neighbors. Community groups won a 1978
injunction against the plant's assembly, arguing that the plant's nitrogen dioxide
emissions would be a public health hazard. [16] After the injunction was overturned and
the plant completed in 1980, it was again prevented from coming online when the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering to consider the effects of particulate matter in
evaluating its overall effect on public health. At that time, diesel technology was
becoming outdated, and energy plants in urban areas had turned to cleaner fuels like
natural gas. [17] By the time the plant opened in 1986, the effect of the long delay raised
the project's total cost from a projected $50 million to an eventual $336 million.
Although the facility today generates a healthy operating surplus, it is not enough to pay
down the heavy debt service burden on the project. [18] In the final analysis, then,
MATEP as a project was a net loss for Harvard because of community resistance to it. It
served to teach Harvard, through conflict with its surrounding communities, that the
power balance between the two players had changed.
In following with Coser's model of the social functions of conflict, the tumult of the
1970s was the result of the changing power balance among hospitals, communities, and
local government during that time. The "rules" of the land use game were rapidly
changing. Through systemic changes and their own organizing, community groups had
unprecedented power with respect to hospitals. Yet exactly how much was unclear.
Harvard Medical School caved on its former convent parcel, building affordable housing
there as the community wished; but at the same time, through years of bitter struggle, it
pushed its power plant through to completion over the constant and vocal opposition
from its neighbors. The failure of MATEP beautifully illustrates Coser's thoughts about
one of the functions conflict serves: recalibrating the relationship between two parties by
demonstrating changes in their relative power. MATEP modified the norms of the
political process to reach a new power equilibrium. [5]
By 1980, it was clear that the balance of power had tipped further toward the community
over the preceding decade. Instead of simply cutting back the amount of land it would
take and clear for institutional expansion, Harvard had thrown up its hands and simply
followed through with its agreement to build affordable housing. Community power was
the new paradigm in planning. In addition, as we shall see, hospitals were struggling
economically themselves, making costly fights like the one over MATEP even more
unwelcome.
Tough Times for Hospitals in the 1980s
Across the United States in the early 1980s, Reagan-era cuts to Medicare reimbursements
forced teaching hospitals to pay more attention to their patient care activities to stay
solvent. Many turned to competing for highly expensive procedures like organ
transplantation. The advent of managed care in the 1980s, whereby insurance companies
dictated to hospitals what they would pay for procedures, forced many to close or merge
in the mid-1980s. As hospitals became more focused on high technology, primary care
moved to outpatient clinic locations far from hospitals. [9]
Hospitals continued to suffer into the late 1980s. Between 1984 and 1993, 949 hospitals
shut their doors in the United States. Indeed, the ongoing trend over at least the past two
decades has been net hospital closures, brought about by declining occupancy and
revenue alongside rising costs. In the year 2000, over 5000 hospitals existed in the United
States, and an average of about 40 hospitals had closed each year for the past decade,
most of them in urban areas. [19]
The Era of Reconciliation:
New Partnerships Between Hospital and Community, 1985 - Present
The 1980s saw a gradual easing of tensions between communities and hospitals.
Hospitals perhaps were humbled by their economic troubles and weary of constant
fighting with their neighbors. The community empowerment paradigm gradually shifted
away from that of protesting against the system as perpetual outsiders. Instead,
community activists began to become insiders, making deals with other insiders. Recall
that Harvard professor and expansion advocate F. D. Moore wrote disparagingly in 1970
that activists' method of choice was "roughing up institutions." [4] Moore's "roughing
up" was no longer necessary. Community organizations had earned their place at the
bargaining table. The memories of the "roughing up" of which they were still capable,
however, did not fade. The ongoing potential for "roughing up" the institutions of the
LMA was one factor that contributed to the community groups' new power.
The 1990s were a decade of unprecedented cooperation between hospitals and
universities. In 1992, Children's Hospital of Boston and the Fenway CDC made a
groundbreaking agreement of their own, circumventing the BRA. The Fenway had never
experienced the same level of intense conflict with the Longwood medical institutions
that Mission Hill had, for a variety of reasons. It was buffered from the area by parkland;
the population of the Fenway was more affluent and thus more enfranchised; and the
Fenway had other institutional neighbors that were greater sources of conflict over the
decades, including Northeastern University and the Boston Red Sox. [20] [21]
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The forces that brought Children's Hospital and the Fenway CDC together were
serendipitous. The CDC had assumed the role of affordable housing developer since
1980, and its leaders were intrigued by the possibility of partnering with a nearby
institution to defray upfront costs. Partnering with a medical institution would cause less
of a political credibility problem for the CDC than partnering with a university like
Northeastern that was strongly disliked by Fenway residents. [21] Children's was the first
of several institutions of the Longwood Medial Area to develop their first initiatives in
conjunction with the Fenway and Mission Hill. Another impetus for changes in hospital-
community relations was the arrival of a new vice president of operations at the LMA's
Medical Academic and Scientific Community Organization (MASCO), according to Carl
Koechlin. [10]
MASCO dates from 1972, when it was formed as the Shared Services Corporation to
coordinate operations and planning among its member institutions to reduce costs. A
secondary goal of the Corporation was to improve the relationship between the
institutions as a whole and their neighbors in the Fenway and Mission Hill. The
organization continues to operate as the Medical Academic and Scientific Community
Organization, Inc. (MASCO). In FY 2003, MASCO received over $24 million in
revenues from its member institutions and other sources. Much of its operations budget
goes toward providing a complex private transit network that carries students and
employees back and forth from Harvard, MIT, satellite parking lots, and several MBTA
transit nodes.
David Eppstein, the second person to hold MASCO's Director of Community Affairs
position, had come from a community organizing background. He made a point of
making contact with local non-profits, so former Fenway CDC staffer Bob van Meter and
David Eppstein had formed the beginnings of a professional relationship. Meanwhile,
Children's Hospital was planning a major expansion and had linkage obligations to the
city. It was the shortage of local housing for hospital staff that originally drew planners at
Children's to the idea of earmarking their linkage money for a local housing project.
Eppstein brought leaders of the Fenway CDC and Children's together (he refers to
himself as Longwood's "yenta") to formulate a plan to jointly develop affordable housing
in the Fenway, using Children's linkage obligations as a funding source. According to
van Meter, the BRA was not initially receptive to the plan, because it counted on linkage
money from such expansions for its "slush fund" to support high-priority projects
throughout the city. Ultimately, however, the BRA agreed to the deal, and the housing
project was completed. The rules have since been tightened. [21] According to Jane
Matlaw at Beth Israel-Deaconess Medical Center, although hospitals would like to
earmark linkage funds to individual nonprofits, it is no longer possible today; CDCs must
write grants themselves to access linkage funds. [22]
The Fenway CDC continued its productive relationship with MASCO. In 1991-1992,
MASCO built a parking garage and daycare center on a large parcel it had bought from
Temple Israel. MASCO committed 25% of the garage's city-mandated payment-in-lieu-
of-taxes (PILOT) obligations, or approximately $18,000 yearly, to support the work of
the Fenway CDC. This continues to be a funding source for the nonprofit. [21]
In 1994, the Fenway CDC and MASCO collaborated on a new program to place low-
income Fenway residents into LMA jobs, which they named the "Walk-to-Work"
initiative. Walk-to-Work was funded by linkage money from LMA institutions. By
working with human resource managers at hospitals, Barbara Burnham at the Fenway
CDC was able to identify "points of access" for neighborhood residents into the relatively
high-paying and stable health-care employment sector. [21] Another important
employment program was "Bridges to the Future," which targeted low-wage
"incumbent" health care workers from the neighborhoods surrounding the LMA.
48
"Bridges to the Future" helped them to move up the health care career ladder and
ultimately secure a job paying a living wage. [23]
Outreach efforts were not just targeted to hospitals' residential neighbors. In 1994, as part
of the "Walk-to-Work" program, MASCO published a business directory of locally
available services for distribution to its member institutions. According to David
Eppstein, "It's the little steps that help people realize that the institutions don't have to
turn their backs on the neighborhood." [20] In 1996, the Mission Hill Board of Trade
followed suit as it published coupon books for Mission Hill businesses and distributed
them in Longwood medical institutions. The books are associated with the remarkably
named "Hands Across Huntington Avenue" campaign, and institutional administrators
eagerly responded to this show of goodwill. [6] Although this campaign targeted the local
business community instead of the residential community, Eppstein feels that it was a
milestone in hospital-community relationships, demonstrating to local businesses that the
LMA was making an effort to treat them respectfully and take them seriously as potential
partners. The power balance between hospitals and communities had evened out.
City
Hospital Neighborhood
Figure 6: The hospital-city-neighborhood triad 1985 - 2005
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Giving Control to the Community in the 1990s
Just before the Children's-Fenway deal, in 1989, Harvard put an end to the most
contentious era of hospital-community relations by offering its "Ledge" parcel for sale.
This parcel had been a bone of contention every since its purchase by Harvard in 1958, as
a symbol of the institution's impending expansion across Huntington Avenue and into the
residential heart of Mission Hill. The rise of neighborhood power in the 1970s had
ensured that the Longwood Medical Area never crossed Huntington Avenue, but actually
giving the parcel up was an acknowledgment of defeat by Harvard. As through the
Riverway at Mission Park development, Harvard retreated from its expansion plans and
ensured that it would stay within the confines of Huntington Avenue.
Harvard approached Mission Hill Neighborhood Housing Services (MHNHS), its former
political foe, for help in finding a buyer that would develop the parcel according to the
neighborhood's wishes. [24] While Harvard originally gave MHNHS just two years to
find a buyer, after a community planning process that resulted in a scheme for retail,
office, and open space, the organization finally issued an request for proposals (RFP) to
developers in 1995. It chose a developer in 1996 [11], and the development was
completed in May 2003. The finished project contained profitable office space,
neighborhood-serving retail, and open space. The development represented another
opportunity for reconciliation between the hospitals and Mission Hill, as the office space
MHNHS leased at market rates to medical tenants offset the financial losses generated by
the other uses desired by the community. [7]
Harvard continued its gradual withdrawal from residential neighborhoods as it made
plans to sell its Riverway at Mission Park affordable housing development to Roxbury




By the end of the 2 0 th century, the new paradigm of negotiation had calmed the tensions
between the hospitals and neighborhoods. When Harvard decided to sell Mission Park,
Robert Parks, director of RTH, told the Boston Globe, "Harvard did the right thing and
kept to every commitment." [26] This observation would have been astonishing 30 years
earlier, when Parks, about to be evicted by Harvard from his Mission Hill apartment, was
a leader in the anti-expansion struggles. [8]
A brief example that demonstrates the new relationship between community, hospital,
and the BRA is the disposition of the former Massachusetts College of Art building when
MassArt moved to its current location on the Avenue of the Arts in the mid-1990s. Beth
Israel purchased the building from the Massachusetts Department of Capital Assets for
new clinical facilities. The Fenway CDC's Bob van Meter does not recall anger from the
Fenway at Beth Israel's expansion, nor a great discussion of alternative uses for the
building. Instead, he said, the Fenway's focus was on the benefits to the neighborhood
that could be derived from the expansion. That Beth Israel's expansion would happen and
that the BRA would require it to make concessions to the community in return was
simply a given at that point. [21]
Hospital-Community Relations Today
The LMA has not seen the end of institutional expansion, but strict and clearly defined
rules have guided new development since 2001. A controversial project proposed by the
Joslin Diabetes Center that included a 300' tower sparked so much neighborhood
criticism that the BRA began a process of creating interim planning guidelines as a
preamble to rezoning the LMA. [27]
By the end of 2001, Boston's overall economy had crashed, and institutions in the city
saw an opportunity to expand. It wasn't just the Joslin Center that had extensive plans.
Hundreds of thousands of square feet of new construction were being proposed. Elected
officials, planners at the BRA, and community groups all became concerned about the
potential for an out-of-control LMA growth spurt. A movement arose to create a new
plan for the LMA, which had not been rezoned since the 1950s. In February 2003, the
BRA adopted a set of interim guidelines for the area, with the goal of completing a
permanent plan within 18 months. Representatives of MASCO worked with the BRA on
the guidelines, and several public meeting were held during the development process.
According to BRA planner Keith Craig, while he would have liked more public
involvement in the form of working groups and charrettes, the process needed to move
too quickly for such workshops to be feasible. The guidelines set an absolute height limit
of 205' for the area and gave developers density bonuses for specific public benefits like
providing housing, extraordinary urban design, and even workforce development. As of
May 2005, the BRA has not yet completed the permanent new plan for the area. Craig
imagines that it will reflect the interim guidelines. [28] [27]
Ironically, the Joslin Center's political lightning rod of a tower was not even the
institution's idea. When it purchased a parcel abutting the clinic on the corner of
Brookline and Longwood Avenues, which contained an 84-unit apartment building, its
goal was simply to build space to conduct diabetes research. According to former Joslin
Center attorney Carl Finn, when the institution approached the mayor's office, Mayor
Menino was very supportive of both the economic growth and medical mission of the
project; however, his deep concern with housing availability in Boston led him to insist
that the Joslin Center replace every apartment it tore down with two new ones. [29]
The Joslin Center had no choice but to cooperate. Representatives attended a series of
community meetings to hear community reactions to an iteration of design proposals.
Although there was no formal negotiation with community groups, both parties knew that
the BRA would not approve a plan that was completely unpalatable to the community.
Finn calls this "indirect negotiation." Ultimately, the Joslin Center was permitted to build
500,000 square feet of clinical, research, and housing space. The Center agreed to
position the tower to minimize the impact of its shadow; to make 10 percent of its
apartments affordable and supply an equal number of affordable apartments offsite; to
grant tenants who had lived in the building for at least five years the right to one of the
new apartments and pay for their housing and moving costs during construction; to locate
its loading dock underground; and fund a job development program in partnership with
the Fenway CDC. While Finn recognizes the importance of community concerns, he
stresses the importance of the mission the Center is undertaking with its new research
building: "[the new building] is important and necessary for diabetes research, so that we
can cure this insidious disease." [29]
Also in 2001, Brigham and Women's Hospital (BWH, the infamous Affiliated Hospital
Complex of the 1970 Harvard-Mission Hill showdown) went through a process similar to
the Joslin Center's. The hospital required a new building to house its proposed Center for
Advanced Medicine. The small block across Francis Street from BWH, containing vacant
lots and a few houses, was the hospital's ideal location. Not only did neighborhood
groups now have a great deal of influence with the BRA, but Roxbury Tenants of
Harvard actually held an interest in the block as real estate managers. Harvard, acting on
behalf of BWH, was forced to negotiate with the community directly and indirectly. It
held monthly meetings and some focus groups to keep the community updated on its
latest architectural plans.
The two parties made a deal with very favorable terms for the non-profit. [7] Through a
three-way land transaction involving Harvard, BWH, and RTH, RTH granted permission
for six buildings on the lot in question to be physically moved to a new location one
block away. Harvard sold 31 houses to RTH at favorable prices, and BWH transferred 7
buildings, lots, and mixed-use properties to the non-profit. The Brigham also began
working with the tenants group to extend the services it provided the neighborhood,
including job training and adult education classes in computing skills, ESL, and GED
preparation. [30] In return, the neighborhood groups made it known to the BRA that they
supported Harvard in developing its 10 story, $150 million research center. The BRA
approved the development. [27]
Both these deals are good examples of the new paradigm for institutional expansion in
Boston. Hospitals must keep communities informed of their plans and take their concerns
and reactions seriously if they hope to win approval for their projects. They can also
expect to make substantial concessions to the community. It is not just the BRA that
wields power over institutions, forcing them to do the right thing. The tumultuous 1960s
and 1970s are not forgotten in the Fenway and Mission Hill. At public meetings for
projects like the Joslin Center, a small but vocal group angry residents can be counted on
to denounce the hospitals in no uncertain terms. [27] What if hospitals decided once
again to expand across Huntington Avenue perhaps, buying up land and ignoring their
neighbors? Organizations like Roxbury Tenants of Harvard and the Community Housing
Corporation of Mission Hill have only become stronger over time. If a hospital crossed
the line, these groups could mobilize their members, politicians, and even students. Thus,
the peace between hospital and neighborhood is somewhat fragile, with an undercurrent
of tension. While Keith Craig of the BRA calls the process "unpredictable," it has its own
logic and rhythm. The players know what to expect from each other, and they know the
routine they must take part in.
Hospital-community negotiations in this model are ongoing. The Dana-Farber Cancer
Institute (DFCI) plans to build a clinical and research building where a parking lot and
two low buildings currently reside. Anne Levine, the DFCI's Vice-President of External
Affairs, plans to bring preliminary designs before the LMA Forum (a regularly held
public meeting that MASCO facilitates) in May or June of 2005 and is foreseeing an
iterative negotiating process both at the Forum and with the BRA. "We know we'll have
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to provide housing and job training linkage in compliance with city's formula," she says,
also anticipating that the agency will ask DFCI to make improvements to the nearby
streetscape, sidewalks, and lighting. [31]
Likewise, Brigham and Women's Hospital is planning to collaborate with Roxbury
Tenants of Harvard in developing the former Massachusetts Mental Hospital site in
Mission Hill, creating housing, research space, and a parking garage. John McGonagle of
BWH acknowledges that the hospital works much more closely with community groups
in its physical planning than do other institutions of the LMA, actively consulting and
partnering with them instead of presenting plans and hearing feedback at a public
meeting. "We're the only institution in the LMA that abuts a neighborhood," he explains,
an example of how a hospital's place in the urban fabric affects its relationship with its
neighbors. [7]
The Effect of Ongoing Community Benefits Programs on Hospital-Community
Relations
Even at the height of hospital-community conflict, the hospitals of the Longwood
Medical Area provided important services to local residents. Moore stated that 30 percent
of surgeries at Peter Bent Brigham were emergency, unscheduled procedures. "We have
many patients of ghetto background or foreign extraction, many who are black, brown, or
yellow..." he notes, adding, "There are clinics for family planning, alcoholism, venereal
disease; there are evening clinics and a home-care service." [4, p. 1010]
Today, according to David Eppstein at MASCO, the "hard" benefits like land or cash
offered communities by their hospital neighbors tend to get the most publicity. The
benefits to the neighborhoods of ongoing "soft" programs like free or reduced-cost health
care, however, are at least as great. Eppstein cites both "hard" and "soft" benefits as
crucial to maintaining positive hospital-community relations. [20] Anne Levine at Dana-
Farber agrees, saying, "We have partnered with city on a number of cancer outreach
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efforts, and that has given us a good foundation," when negotiating with government
officials. "It's in our interest to do good work in the community," John McGonagle
agrees.
All the hospitals in the LMA maintain substantial community benefits programs,
spending a relatively high percentage of their budgets on community programs. (See
Chapter 5 for more details.) As a representative example, Beth Israel-Deaconess Medical
Center (BIDMC) spends $27 million out of a $533 million budget annually on
community benefits.
Yet, as Eppstein pointed out, it is difficult to quantify the effect these ongoing benefits
have on hospital-community relations. While they may improve people's lives, programs
are not necessarily well known in the community. For example, the "Walk to Work"
employment program described above was cited by many of my interviewees as an
excellent example of hospital-community cooperation. Yet the program's instigator,
Sarah Griffen, is reluctant to claim that it has had a dramatic effect on people's opinions
of the LMA, especially in its initial incarnation as a "career ladder" program for people
already employed by the hospitals. When the program began working with hospitals to
hire new workers, it gained greater recognition in the surrounding neighborhoods.
According to Griffen, although the pre-employment program is more visible, ultimately,
an $8 - $10 per hour job is not enough for a local employee; thus, the incumbency
program is critical in helping people to advance until they earn a living wage. [23]
Finally, Jane Matlaw at BIDMC says that the community benefits provided by the
hospital undoubtedly contribute to an improved relationship with the community, but that
relationships with community groups often start when a group is in a financial crisis and
looks to Beth Israel for financial help. For Matlaw, this can be a way to get the group
involved in Beth Israel's ongoing community health work. [22] Many community
benefits programs are not terribly visible in the community, even those that have a strong
positive impact on people's lives. Also, many people perceive providing community
health care as simply a hospital's job, not something that will win it additional favor from
the community.
Unresolved Issues and Tensions in the Neighborhood
The relationship between the hospitals of the LMA and their surrounding neighborhoods
has steadily improved since Harvard's 1958 land grab. No matter how cordial the parties
are with each other today, though, and no matter how many joint projects they undertake,
the area can never be free of underlying hospital-community tensions. Some severe
negative hospital impacts can never be eliminated, no matter how good a neighbor the
hospitals become.
Perceptions of safety in the neighborhood have played a role in magnifying hospital-
community conflict. In the 1970s and 1980s, Longwood institutions viewed the Fenway
and Mission Hill as "bad neighborhoods," from which their employees had to be
protected. Much of the street crime in the vicinity was attributed to the nearby Mission
Hill housing project. Naturally, this made their neighbors feel that they were viewed as
criminals and did little to improve community relations. Miriam Garmaise reports that
tensions were high, and communication lacking in the early 1980s. [15]
Improving hospital-community relations began to ease the suspicions on both sides. The
original Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) had its back - a sheer blank wall -
facing Huntington Avenue, sending a distinct unwelcoming message to Mission Hill.
When HSPH built its new building in the early 1990s, it opened onto Huntington Avenue.
Eventually, perceptions of safety changed in the LMA. MASCO soon discontinued an
expensive private police patrol it had run every night from 4 pm to 8 am when the
demand for it ceased. [20]
Traffic congestion generated by the LMA rivals institutional expansion as a point of
contention with the neighborhoods. The two primary arteries through the LMA,
Brookline Street and Huntington Avenue, are also main streets for the Fenway and
Mission Hill, respectively. Not only do these streets bring 37,000 workers and 10,000
patients into the LMA daily, but they also funnel traffic from outer neighborhoods and
suburbs into Downtown Boston. Meanwhile, both neighborhoods have visions for their
main streets that include creating a more pedestrian-friendly atmosphere, widening
sidewalks, and narrowing the streets themselves. These visions are incompatible with
current and projected traffic volumes through the LMA. MASCO's solution has been to
lobby heavily for improved public transit access to the area and to run its own extensive
private shuttle service to and from transit stations and offsite parking lots. While
MASCO's alternative transportation programs have been successful in raising the LMA's
share of all commuting modes other than single-passenger auto to the highest level in
Boston, the mode share of alternative transportation is still just 37 percent. MASCO is
planning to expand its offsite parking program for employees and to pilot a program that
will allow neighborhood residents to ride free on certain shuttles. [20]
I originally postulated that hospital-related gentrification would be a bone of contention.
According to Bob van Meter, though, while gentrification has been an ongoing issue in
the Fenway for decades, there has not been a great deal of discussion about the medical
area as a primary driver. He suspects that most doctors living in the vicinity of the LMA
reside in Brookline rather than the Fenway and cites speculative condo conversion as a
greater force behind gentrification. Nevertheless, the heavy jobs/housing imbalance in
LMA and the transportation problems it causes are quite clear. While some institutions
considered building housing specifically for their workforces in the Fenway during the
1990s, in order to mitigate the externalities of the LMA's many inbound commuters, it
soon became clear that the hospitals' building enough housing in the vicinity to make any
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perceivable difference in commuter congestion was a pipe dream; the commuting
population was simply too large. [20]
Keith Craig agrees that the LMA is an anomaly, easier to work with than other hospitals
and universities because it is a "huge machine," with little "tight residential fabric"
around it. Even some of Boston's community-serving hospitals, such as Caritas St.
Elizabeth's Medical Center in Brighton and New England Baptist Hospital in Mission
Hill, have had bitter conflicts with their residential neighbors in the last decade. They,
like the LMA hospitals, wished to expand; however, they were physically enmeshed in
their neighborhoods. Although many planners in his office have tried to do a master land
use plan for the area, he argues that no Boston politician truly wants to restrict how the
LMA can grow as an economic generator for Boston. The BRA must perform a difficult
balancing act, allowing them to grow economically while protecting their neighbors. [27]
A final and intractable issue in the relationship between hospitals and communities is the
medical mission of the hospitals. While medical institutions can have negative effects on
their neighbors, the BRA acknowledges that many of the Longwood institutions are
advancing medical science and saving many lives, as well as contributing the Boston's
economic and employment base. It is certainly not in the interest of the BRA to rein in
the hospitals so much that they cannot fulfill their medical mission. As elsewhere in the
real estate industry, in negotiations with the BRA, the hospitals make clear their bottom
line, that is, what they need to be approved for the project to be feasible. Because of the
specialized nature of the medical field, BRA staff members tend to be unfamiliar with
industry standards, and it can be difficult to ascertain what concessions it is reasonable to
ask of hospitals. As an example, Keith Craig cites the insistence of some hospitals that
their research labs be in the same building as their clinical facilities instead of offsite, and
it is difficult for the BRA to determine whether this proximity is truly a need of the
research facilities or simply a strong desire. [27]
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Thus, ongoing tension underlies the balanced relationship between hospitals and
communities today. Given that these issues can never quite be resolved, the potential for
a no-holds-barred, furious protest against the hospitals still exists, were they to cross the
line and truly act with disrespect for the neighborhoods. Alongside the hospitals' desires
to do the right thing; alongside the BRA's general desire to advocate for communities in
the regulatory process; this potential for serious conflict is a strong force for holding the
hospitals of the LMA in check.
The next chapter will explore a parallel evolution of hospital expansion-community
benefits negotiation in Boston's Chinatown. The similarities between these two case
studies are striking. Chapter Six will synthesize the data presented in Chapters Three and
Four to draw more general conclusions about hospital-community relations.
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chapter 4
the tufts-new england medical center case study
What is now Boston's Chinatown was first constructed as middle-class housing on tidal
flats that had been filled in the early 1800s. Its original occupants moved out in the latter
half of the 19th century, and the area became the first American home for many Irish,
Jewish, Italian, and Syrian immigrants. [1] Around the turn of the 20th century, Chinese-
Americans began to settle the area, and the Chinese population grew steadily thereafter.
As more Chinese immigrants settled in the 87-acre area that had become the traditional
jumping-off point for new ethnic groups, it became known as Boston's Chinatown, and
while its physical area has dwindled, it remains largely an Asian immigrant enclave
today. [2]
The area has also been home to medical institutions for many decades. The New England
Medical Center (NEMC) as it existed in 1950 was the descendent of a venerable hospital
known as the Boston Dispensary, founded in 1796. Boston's Floating Hospital for
Children, a unique shipboard medical facility whose original mission had been to expose
children to the healthy sea breezes, had built a landside facility adjacent to the Dispensary
in 1931. In 1950, the Tufts School of Medicine moved from its former location adjacent
to Boston Common to its current Harrison Street one to be closer to NEMC, its teaching
hospital. The four medical institutions became concentrated in one small area. [3] Please
see Figures 7 and 8 on pages 65 and 67 for a geographic representation of the area.
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The first few years of the 2 0th century foreshadowed the development pressure that would
come to Chinatown many decades later. Commercial development in Boston's downtown
burgeoned, putting pressure on the ethnic enclave to its south. However, by the century's
midpoint, Boston as a whole was stagnating. City-dwellers were exiting in droves to the
suburbs, leaving flagging urban neighborhoods behind them. Boston officials did not
expect Chinatown to thrive any more than the rest of the city.
Boston's Chinatown, however, defied these predictions, largely because of the 1965
Immigration and Nationality Act, which removed restrictive quotas specifically targeted
at Asian immigrants. Once these provisions were removed, and Asians were allowed to
immigrate at the same rate as Europeans, the population of Chinatown grew faster instead
of declining. [2] In fact, its population tripled between 1950 and 1987. [1]
While convenient for its residents, Chinatown's proximity to the central business district
became problematic for the neighborhood during the era of Urban Renewal. Boston's
downtown had suffered through the first half of the 2 0 th century because no high-volume
transportation link ran through it. Rail lines terminated at South Station, on the south
edge of downtown, and at North Station on the north edge, but the rail lines leading north
and south of the city did not (and still do not) connect with each other. Before the advent
of highways, there was no remotely speedy way to travel through downtown Boston.
With federal funding for highway construction widely available and automobiles newly
dominating the world of transportation, Boston leaders were desperate to create an
elevated freeway connecting its downtown to the North and South Shores outside the
city. This project would come to be known as the Central Artery. The Central Artery
required land to be built over, and it was not surprising that the eyes of Boston's leaders
turned to a centrally located, low-income, non-white neighborhood for this purpose. [4]
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Figure 7:
Land uses in the Tufts-New England Medical Center vicinity
Land Use
C Commercial
E Other Institutional or Government
HDR High Density Residential
LDR Low Density Residential
RC Mixed Use
TE Owned by Tufts

Figure 8: Points of interest around the Tufts-New England Medical Center
Tufts-New England Medical Center
Location of old YMCA
Posner Hall
Washington Street
Stuart and Kneeland Streets
The Central Artery
The Turnpike Extension
Former Don Bosco High School
9. Tai Tung Village affordable housing complex
10. Parcel 24
11. Wang Center for the Performing Arts
(former Metropolitan Theater)
12. Parcel C
13. Tyler Street Parcel
14. The Combat Zone
15. The Sackler Center

The first proposed route for the Artery took it through Chinatown and the predominantly
Italian North End, leading to vociferous protests from both neighborhoods. Ultimately,
the path of the freeway was rerouted, sparing the North End and taking just one block of
Chinatown. [4] Although it took less land than anticipated, the artery had a devastating
effect on the neighborhood. It was built between 1953 and 1959 and cut Chinatown off
from the transit hub of South Station, the employment center of the Leather District, and
Boston Harbor, all to the east.
The Massachusetts Turnpike Extension was a similar highway project driven by the need
for a high-volume transportation corridor from Downtown and the Artery to the area west
of Boston. Begun in 1963, its construction cleared even more of Chinatown's land than
the Artery did, destroying hundreds of residences. The Turnpike Extension also cut
Chinatown off from the residential South End neighborhood to its west. Together, these
highway projects covered half of Chinatown's former physical area. [5] Another blow to
Chinatown was the zoning of several nearby blocks on Washington Street for adult
entertainment, creating the notorious "Combat Zone," which became a red-light district
and a magnet for crime after Copley Square, the former de facto adult district, was
cleared. [2] Thus, the Combat Zone cut Chinatown off from the CBD as well. [1]
T-NEMC's Strategic Planning in Chinatown Pre-1965
The Tufts-New England Medical Center, now embedded in Chinatown, also had a
profound effect on the neighborhood during the 1960s. The institutions of T-NEMC had
begun buying nearby parcels of land on the open market in the early 1950s and continued
through the 1960s, setting the stage for a dramatic physical expansion in the next two
decades. In the early 1960s, T-NEMC bought two major parcels, the Metropolitan
Theater (now the Wang Center) and the Wilbur Theater. [6]
By 1964, T-NEMC owned 11 acres in the area [5], and over the two decades from 1950
to 1970 increased its holdings by 8 acres. [2] Some parcels were of a fine-grained urban
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fabric, containing small, tightly knit commercial and multi-family residential buildings,
like those east of Harrison Avenue and south of Nassau Street. A few were large,
venerable theater parcels and parking lots across Washington Street from the existing
medical center. T-NEMC was disinclined to be a landlord; when it acquired these
buildings, it tended to demolish them when possible or leave them vacant. Before the
master planning process of the 1960s, there was little to keep T-NEMC from buying the
properties and tearing them down, whether the community opposed their actions or not;
the institutions were essentially free to do as they liked with their newly acquired parcels.
[6] In total, from 1940 to 1971, Tufts razed 167 housing units in the Chinatown/South
Cove area. [2]
T-NEMC's first new construction of the urban renewal era, the Posner Hall dormitory for
dental and medical students, was built in 1954. [7] Residential buildings inhabited by
Chinese families were torn down to make way for it, which compromised the character of
the entire block as a cohesive row of Chinese-owned houses. Their demolition
foreshadowed the eventual demise of the entire block between Tyler and Hudson streets
as a residential neighborhood. The fact that so many residences were torn down, either to
make way for Posner or for general clearance, strained the relationship between T-NEMC
and the community and caused others who lived nearby to fear also losing their housing
to institutional expansion. [6]
Those who participated in the events have differing recollections of the relationship
between hospital and community at the time. Elliot Rothman, a Boston architect who
worked in the T-NEMC planning office from 1961 to 1964, recalls that the zeitgeist of
urban renewal had a profound effect on Tufts officials. Rothman remembers a group of
idealistic "visionaries" in the university's administration - Herman Field, Geneva Cass,
and Dr. Lewis J. P. Colissi Jr. - who saw the movement as an exciting opportunity to
make a bold plan for the medical institutions. This plan would improve the institution, the
neighborhood, and the city itself. [6] Others remember T-NEMC as a hostile neighbor
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preoccupied with its own expansion ambitions and a hospital that refused to provide
health care for the neighborhood's uninsured. [2] [8]
What is certain is that T-NEMC, like the LMA, was free to do as it pleased in the 1950s,
as is evidenced by its unimpeded construction of Posner Hall and the purchasing and
clearance of a great deal of property around the institution. At this time, T-NEMC was a
very powerful entity. The Chinese community had no power to speak of in the land use
decision-making process, and the BRA was not involved. This power balance, weighted
heavily toward the medical center, was to change over the next decades, just as did the
power balance between the LMA and its surrounding neighborhoods. The same circle





Figure 5: The pre-1965 power balance
The End of T-NEMC's Autonomy: 1965
NEMC embarked on a major comprehensive planning effort starting in 1961. As noted in
the previous chapter, the Boston Redevelopment Agency, under development
administrator Edward J. Logue, was on good terms with the city's large institutions at
that time and eager to work together with them on urban renewal projects. In the era of
institutional reorganization, the New England Medical Center and Tufts formed an
alliance, becoming the Tufts-New England Medical Center (T-NEMC) in 1962 [2], and
in 1965, T-NEMC merged with the Floating Hospital for Children. [9]
T-NEMC's strategy was to wait until the BRA had completed its own urban renewal
efforts in Chinatown to make any major moves. The institution provided some input into
the plan and gave the BRA information about its own needs and desires. The BRA then
successfully petitioned the Federal office of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to
designate Chinatown and nearby blocks as the South Cove Urban Renewal Zone. "[Ed]
Logue and the city were good friends," Rothman recalls. The BRA and T-NEMC
simultaneously worked on their plans for the area, negotiating the limits of T-NEMC's
expansion. The BRA was in a tricky position, realizing both the great value of Chinatown
to its residents and the city as a whole, as well as the economic potential of T-NEMC.
Eventually, the BRA and T-NEMC came to an agreement: the hospital would not expand
south of Oak Street or east of Tyler Street; nor would it expand across Kneeland Street to
the north. In return, the BRA agreed to support the construction of new institutional
facilities, including some medical office uses in the Kneeland-Stuart Street area and a
parking garage somewhere on the outskirts of the medical complex. Representatives of T-
NEMC initially opposed the creation of any new housing in its vicinity, but agreed to the
residential designation of the area that would become Tai Tung Village, an affordable
housing development, in order to get the BRA's blessing for its own expansion plans.
The BRA and the Chinatown community agreed on a vision for a school, housing, and
parking on the site bounded by Washington Street, the Turnpike, and Shawmut Avenue,
to the southwest of the medical center. [8]
During the early 1960s, then, the balance of power shifted in Chinatown. T-NEMC could
no longer build freely on its own land. The BRA stepped into the hospital-neighborhood
conflict and took the side of the neighborhood. Having a government agency as an
advocate was new for Chinatown; the Commonwealth and Turnpike Authority had been
responsible for the devastating clearance projects associated with the Central Artery and
Turnpike Extension. This shift of power, whereby the BRA assisted the community,
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happened earlier than it had in the LMA, perhaps because of the imminent threat of major
clearance for institutional expansion. T-NEMC was busily working on a master plan that
included wide-ranging clearance, and it hoped to implement its plan as soon as possible.
Since T-NEMC owned so much land in its vicinity, creating an alternative for the
neighborhood was critical.
Fortunately for Chinatown, a new planning paradigm was emerging in which community
groups had a voice in the decision-making process. The specter of the West End urban
renewal disaster still hung over the Boston redevelopment world. BRA Director Ed
Logue himself had suffered an embarrassing public relations defeat in Charlestown when
the community protested furiously against his original urban renewal plans. Logue and
then-mayor Collins were staunchly opposed to major West End-style clearance in the
name of urban renewal. According to Elliot Rothman, Ed Logue made a point of
consulting Chinatown community leaders during the planning process because urban
renewal had become such a politically sensitive topic. The city pushed back against T-
NEMC's expansion plans. Nevertheless, T-NEMC wielded a great deal of power via its
own wealth and "112 credits" - the potential major Federal contributions to its land
acquisition and clearance expenses, as noted in Chapter Two. Given the lack of precedent
for intervening against institutional expansion, the agency's negotiations were not as
hard-nosed as they might be today; indeed, the amount of new land devoted to
institutional uses would be overwhelming by today's standards. In the final South Cover
Urban Renewal Plan, many blocks were designated for T-NEMC's use, including the
large theater parcels across Washington Street from the existing medical center. [8] "[The
BRA] would never let an institution cross a major street again," Rothman opined wryly.
[6] Still, the explicit goal for the South Cove Urban Renewal Plan was to avert another
West End-style disaster and improve the neighborhood for its residents' sake. 1965 was a




Figure 6: The 1965-1970 power balance
The 1965 T-NEMC Master Plan
T-NEMC published a draft version of its own master plan in 1964. [6] It represented the
ideal outcome of BRA negotiations for the institution and advocated major expansion.
This new growth would lie primarily to the west across Washington Street, using an NIH
grant to build a new Boston Floating Hospital that would be connected to the current T-
NEMC. Some new development would also occur to the east and south. Expansion to the
north across Kneeland Street was deemed politically impossible even in the T-NEMC
plan. [6] To accommodate additional future expansion, the plan also recommended
buying as much land in the vicinity as possible.
According to this 1964 version of the 1965-1985 comprehensive plan, its goals were:
"1) To break out of a land locked position which stood in the way of rational growth and
long-range development of its facilities, and to acquire the property to achieve this where
needed at a reasonable cost.
2) To arrest the progressing blight of the surrounding area, which has created an
environment increasingly incompatible with the purposes of this Institution and
detrimental to its proper functioning and growth.
3) To replace the present obsolete street and traffic pattern of the area with one that
allows for full development of the Medical Center and other future functions of this part
of downtown, and as part of this to meet the Medical Center's future parking and
transportation needs.
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4) To provide for a neighborhood housing supply of quantity and character to meet
present and future Medical Center staff and student needs, and to provide a stabilizing
and compatible land use in the Medical Center's vicinity.
5) To lay the basis for a stable viable downtown neighborhood, structured and planned
for a permanent positive symbiosis of its institutional and other sectors.
6) To provide long-range land bank possibilities for later growth of the Medical Center
beyond the foreseeable future." [5, pp. 1-2]
It seems that these goals implicitly assumed that what is good for T-NEMC would also be
good for Chinatown as a whole, although it also acknowledged that Chinatown leaders
had opposed T-NEMC's acquisition of additional land. [5] Elliot reports that the attitude
of the medical center in that era was that it naturally "dominated" Chinatown, sharply
contrasting with what he sees as the present acknowledgment that the center is a "guest"
in the neighborhood. [6]
T-NEMC also proposed to materially assist the neighborhood of Bay Village lying
several blocks to the west in improving its housing. Bay Village at the time was a
predominantly white, emerging gay/bohemian residential area. To the east, two small
blocks - a residential strip between Hudson and Tyler Streets and a block between Tyler
Street and Harrison Avenue (lying immediately south of Posner Hall) - were to be
maintained as housing for the "Chinese Community" [5], in agreement with the South
Cove Urban Renewal Plan. T-NEMC also aimed to land bank the 8-10 acres NEMC and
Don Bosco High School and the Turnpike Extension by developing 500 housing units
and 700 parking spaces for its staff and students, which could be redeveloped someday
for other institutional purposes. Finally, the entire area from Washington Street to Tyler
Street and from Stuart Street to Oak Street would be devoted to T-NEMC's institutional
uses, including a helipad and a skywalk over Washington Street.
Integral to the 1964 plan is the concept of "land banking," whereby T-NEMC would
acquire land beyond that needed for its 20-year plan to facilitate unpredictable growth
after 1985. Thus, T-NEMC wished to obtain additional land even outside these
boundaries to account for future expansion needs. For example, the report suggests that
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T-NEMC acquire the four-block area northeast of Bay Village and develop it into high-
rise apartments and parking as a land banking strategy. Likewise, the residential blocks
east and south of T-NEMC were considered unlikely for immediate redevelopment but
good land banking sites. The most feasible direction for major expansion for T-NEMC
was westward, into a blighted area with relatively few residences. [5]
When the plan mentions community benefits, it cites mainly the additions T-NEMC
could make to the field of medicine as a whole as a research institution and the high-
quality services it could provide to individual patients. In terms of T-NEMC's benefits to
the non-medical community, the plan cites its
"Specialized responsibilities of the Medical Center, in light of its crucial intown [sic]
location in a changing city, to service nearby urban and suburban neighborhoods, rural
areas of the New England region, particular sections of the nation, and selected foreign
countries." [5, p. 99]
The ambitious scope of this service mission strikes one as bewilderingly broad.
Significantly, the plan does not single out its next-door neighbors in Chinatown any more
than the rest of the world as candidates for its medical services. In fact, the plan states,
"An educational medical center must maintain a set of 'gates' that carefully monitor and
control the numbers and kinds of patients that enter to be served. These 'gates' ... have
more to do with planning decisions at the educational medical center than do community
needs...." [5, p. 101]
On the other hand, the plan does make some references to community relations. It
advocates an urban design appropriate to the neighborhood that would strengthen T-
NEMC's relationship with the local community. The plan also recommends creating two
open spaces accessible to the community, a park on the south side of Bennet Street and
another small park north of Posner Hall.
Overall, the plan assumes a great deal of autonomy on the part of the medical center.
While it includes some references to the community's wishes, its subtext is that T-NEMC
grants master planning concessions to the community out of its own good will, not
because of pressure from an authority or mandate.
Chinatown Community Organizing in the 1960s
During the first years of urban renewal, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent
Association (CCBA), a venerable umbrella organization, was seen as the voice of
Chinatown. It represented some of the Chinese community's more influential members
and served as the liaison from Chinatown to the BRA during the implementation of the
South Cove Urban Renewal Plan. [2]
According to Elliot Rothman, the involvement of the Chinese community in T-NEMC's
comprehensive planning process was "subtle" but existent. A social worker employed by
the T-NEMC planning office would attend meetings at the Chinese Merchants
Association to gain its members' feedback. Rothman reports that the attitude of T-NEMC
planners toward the community was that the institutions dominated the power structure,
but that they would be respectful of their neighbors. [6]
Rothman characterizes the Tufts-Chinatown relations at the time as "emergent" and says
that the opinion of the Chinese community weighed heavily in his office's decisions,
although the relationship had not yet been formalized by the BRA. For example, he
recalls that Tufts, and especially his supervisor, Herman Field, supported the Chinese
community's priority of locating a new public school in the area, which exists today as
the Josiah Quincy Elementary School. [6] Thus, residents of Chinatown wielded some
power, not just because the BRA was crafting the South Cove Urban Renewal Plan, but
also because T-NEMC did not wish to completely alienate its neighbors.
The aftermath of plan publication: 1965-1970
The federally approved South Cove Urban Renewal Plan, like similar plans in the
Fenway and Mission Hill, was adopted in 1965. The plan was a far cry from demolition-
heavy projects like the West End; its ultimate goal was to maintain the integrity of
Chinatown as a neighborhood and increase the supply of housing in the area via dense
residential developments like Tai Tung Village. [8] Nevertheless, the plan did posit that
Chinatown had reached a state of "extreme blight," noting that 70.5 percent of residential
buildings had physical defects. The plan called for some "slum clearance" in Chinatown
in order to build the Tai Tung Village affordable housing complex. Altogether, from the
Central Artery to Tai Tung, 585 households in the neighborhood were displaced during
the urban renewal years, approximately 57 percent of which were Chinese, for a total of
at least 1000 Chinese residents. [2]
The next year, in 1966, two Memoranda of Understanding, one between the BRA and
Chinatown and one between the BRA and T-NEMC, tentatively sorted out some of the
thornier dilemmas in the neighborhood. One was land ownership: the area was a
patchwork of public, private, and institutional land. The BRA facilitated a land swap
whereby T-NEMC received additional land after giving up the rights to build on the
aforementioned residential parcels, formalizing the Tyler Street/Oak Street line. These
MOUs did not completely clarify ownership issues in the area, however, and their lack of
clarity fostered land use disputes for decades to come, especially as the BRA's attitude
changed in the future, tipping the balance of power in the neighborhood further toward
the community instead of T-NEMC. [10] The Memoranda of Understanding also
solidified the Urban Renewal Plan's promise of community-oriented uses, including
housing and a school, which would be built in coming years.
The second half of the 1960s was a time of grassroots power building in Chinatown. New
community organizations, such as the Chinese American Civic Association, began to
spring up in the late 1960s. These newcomers did not necessarily agree with the business-
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oriented CCBA's policies. They represented younger, less affluent, and more radical
members of the community. [2] The community-oriented elements of the South Cove
Urban Renewal Plan were essentially completed by the end of the 1970s. The Quincy
school was built and included a "little city hall" and health center - neighborhood
empowerment innovations developed by Mayor Kevin White. The nearby new MassPike
and Castle Square affordable housing developments were able to absorb some of
Chinatown's growth and loss of housing to T-NEMC. More significantly for hospital-
community relations, the late-1960s construction of Tai Tung Village, a 240-unit
affordable housing complex, filled a gap in Chinatown and blocked T-NEMC's
expansion. According to Elliot Rothman, community fears that more housing would be
destroyed were a key motivator in the development of Tai Tung Village. Without the
urban renewal process to galvanize the community and provide for land acquisition and
assembly via the BRA, he speculates, the development may never have happened. [6] As
in the LMA case study, we can observe the manifestation of Coser's idea that an external
threat can bring a community together, and conflict can put in place new organizational
structures. [11] The era of community empowerment had caught up with T-NEMC.
Hospital Development and Community Organizing in the 1970s
The 1970s saw much of T-NEMC's master plan and the South Cove Urban Renewal Plan
of the 1960s come to fruition. Tufts University's new Dental School at Kneeland and
Washington Streets was constructed in 1971, followed by a brand new building for the
Boston Floating Hospital (part of the Medical Center) in the mid-1970s. While federal
funds for urban renewal dried up during this time, Federal funding for health care
research and institutions provided hospitals like T-NEMC with continued support for
expansion. In addition to the research and health care services they provided, the
government saw supporting medical and dental schools as an investment in economic
engines that could revitalize cities. To capitalize on this trend, T-NEMC established
lobbyists at both the state and federal levels to guarantee its share of health care funding.
[12]
4.
At the same time, new community institutions developed. The South Cove Community
Health Center opened in 1972. The Chinese Progressive Association (CPA), another
grassroots-oriented community organization, was founded in 1978. [2] While T-NEMC
attempted to make some concessions to the community during this decade, tensions eased
very little. Grassroots community organizing continued to gain ground, and community
organizations became bolder and more powerful. At the beginning of the decade, a
"Seven-Man Committee" made up of seven prominent Chinese citizens, was formed to
represent the community in planning negotiations with T-NEMC. No public meetings
were held, and this opaque negotiating style continued into the 1980s; however, by the
end of the decade, younger activists like the CPA expanded the scope of who spoke for
Chinatown and furthered a more populist agenda. [12]
Under Kevin White, Mayor of Boston from 1968 to 1984, the BRA became more
influential in Chinatown and forced T-NEMC to negotiate seriously with the Chinese
community and achieve some measure of approval in return for granting building
permits. "Meetings could get boisterous, with people yelling back and forth, and then
we'd have some dinner and yell some more," Thomas Murnane recalls. [12] Lindemann's
predictions after observing the West End's demise that "Meetings at which people shout
and get angry with each other . .. may represent a salutary phase of communal growth,
even though they alarm the public and put a severe strain on the political process," had
come true. [13] Just as the vocal protests against Harvard Medical School in the LMA led
to an era of more harmonious relations, the yelling back and forth of the T-NEMC and
Seven-Man Committee meetings would eventually subside into a relationship both could
live with. Once both parties had taken a decade or so to feel out each other's strength, the
boisterous negotiations settled into a more predictable process. The hospital-community-
city power balance settled at a new equilibrium.
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Figure 7: The 1970-1985 power balance
The data I gathered indicate that, for the T-NEMC/Chinatown case, the settling-down
process would take a few years longer. Into the 1990s, when the institutions of the LMA
were cutting all manner of deals with local CDCs, T-NEMC was still trying to go around
the community to build a parking garage on Parcel C, as I will describe later. One reason
for the longevity of hospital-community tensions could be the fine-grained urban
boundary the two parties shared so intimately. Not only did T-NEMC immediately abut
Chinatown, but a clear boundary had not always existed separated it from the community
the way Huntington Avenue separated the LMA from Mission Hill. As T-NEMC had
crept into residential Chinatown, its buildings had been at times chock-a-block to
residents' homes, sharing the same narrow blocks. Another reason for continued hostility
could have been the lack of an equivalent to the LMA's David Eppstein at MASCO, a
trained community organizer. Although T-NEMC employed planners and community
relations specialists, Eppstein's credibility as a former neighborhood advocate himself
gave him credibility.
Thomas Murnane, a former Tufts senior vice president and dean of the dental school,
recalls the 1970s as the beginning of a more cooperative era, albeit one in which
cooperation was much less formal and transparent than it is today. The idea of
community involvement was still in its formative years at T-NEMC. At the beginning of
the 1970s, some Tufts administrators dreamed of opening a veterinary school at the
Chinatown campus location but ultimately failed to convince the community of its value,
so the veterinary school eventually opened in Grafton. [12] This was one of the first
major development battles won by the residential community.
After the new Tufts Dental School and Floating Hospital opened successfully, Tufts
Medical School decided to undergo a new round of enhancement in the mid-1970s,
beginning to plan for its Sackler Center for Health Communications, which would open
in 1983, and its Tupper research center, which would open in 1986.
The planning for the Sackler Center was something of a landmark for hospital-
community relations, because it was the first time that the BRA insisted that T-NEMC
negotiate significant community benefits for Chinatown in return for its permit approval,
according to current Tufts University Director of Community Relations Barbara Rubel.
[14] T-NEMC was forced to negotiate with St. James Church, from which it bought some
of the property, as well as with the Chinese community. The Sackler Center's
construction would mean the destruction of the Harrison Avenue raincoat factories that
had become important employers, as well as a laundromat that was a popular gathering
place. [12] In the process of obtaining a permit for the Sackler Center, which opened in
1983, Tufts agreed to build a rectory for St. James, give the Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Association $100,000 to invest, and institute scholarships to Tufts to be
administered by the CCBA. [14] Here were the very tangible "hard" community benefits
of land and money being offered to community interests.
One unusual bone of contention between Tufts and the community in the 1970s was a
service project Tufts instigated in Mound Bayou, Mississippi. The Medical Center had
opened a community health center in the impoverished, all-African American town in
1967 to provide basic health care to the underserved, which it maintained through the
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1970s. While the program achieved great results in rural Mississippi, successfully
fighting malnutrition and unemployment, Chinatown residents were somewhat outraged
by it; after all, there were plenty of people underemployed and underserved by the health
care system just blocks away from the Medical School. [8]
In the late 1970s, Tufts at one point considered expanding north into the "Combat Zone"
around Washington Street. This provoked a violent response from the organized crime
interests that oversaw some of the Combat Zone's less savory activities; Murnane recalls
receiving death threats, and saboteurs went so far as to set off explosives in his wife's car
in Marblehead during that period. The Tufts president carried his own gun. Ultimately,
Tufts decided against expanding into the Combat Zone, [12] but in 1981, the institution
bought garment factories 15-35 Kneeland Street, which, again, eliminated the jobs of 80
garment workers. [2]
Overall, Murnane describes the relationship between T-NEMC and the Chinese
community thus: "We were both gracious and both determined." While both parties had
strong objectives, they stayed civil with each other. "I had a very good relationship with
the Chinese community," Murnane recalls. [12]
It is interesting to note the negotiating process in this era. While the BRA retained the
power to approve or reject T-NEMC's building permits, the institution engaged in
negotiations of its own with the Seven-Man Committee. The BRA served as a legal
arbiter, but it did not need to mediate between the two parties; they came together of their
own accord. The 1970s were also a decade of beginning to understand the community's
needs. While conflict was intense, the Medical Center was beginning to involve
community members in its planning process. The new political reality of citizen
empowerment as a national movement, reinforced by President Carter nationally and
Mayor Kevin White locally, contributed to this inclusion.
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The Beginning of a Dialogue in the 1980s
The era of reconciliation between the Chinatown community and T-NEMC did not begin
until the mid-1980s. Tufts Director of Community Relations Barbara Rubel began
working at Tufts in those years, and she recalls encountering a great deal of hostility
between the institutions and community. She also found that the institution reneging even
on an earlier promise to allow the community use of its facilities for meeting spaces when
she began her job, and she recalls that the community was very frustrated with the
Medical Center's actions. [14]
Throughout the 1980s, under another populist mayor, Ray Flynn, and his BRA director,
Stephen Coyle, the BRA continued as a strong ally of Chinatown. It prioritized curbing
institutional expansion into the neighborhood's residential areas, from the Cultural
District as well as from Tufts. The agency also worked with neighborhood organizations
to facilitate the construction of new affordable housing. [15] Finally, the BRA rejected
outright a 1988 T-NEMC proposal to build an 850-car garage on Parcel C, located south
of the medical center. [2]
T-NEMC initially resisted some of the BRA's moves, such as resolving ownership
patterns and development rights that had been disputed in the 1966 MOU in favor of the
community. The institution went so far as to sue the BRA at one point. Ultimately,
however, the BRA's actions helped to ease tensions between the neighborhood and
institutions. [10]
By the end of the 1980s, Tufts administrators hoped to build a medical research center to
capitalize on the economic potential the pharmaceutical industry represented at the time.
By then, however, it had become truly infeasible for Tufts to build the large facility it
envisioned in its Chinatown location. The institution won a BRA-sponsored competition
to be the developer of the air rights over South Station by adding large office, hotel, and
transportation components to its research project. The development agreement was aided
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by Tufts' promises of $ 8.1 million in housing linkage funds, $ 1.6 million for jobs
training, $500,000 to a South Boston affordable housing program, $50,000 to the
Chinatown Neighborhood Center, technical help to community organizations planning
for the use of a Kneeland Street parcel, and attempts to use more Chinatown vendors in
its contracts. Tufts's credibility in the health care industry helped as well during the
citywide economic downturn, for which the pharmaceutical industry was seen as a cure.
[12] [16] These costly concessions represented new citywide rules for large commercial
developments; developers were mandated to contribute a portion of their construction
costs to housing and job trainings "linkage" funds.
A sudden economic downturn caused the complex South Station project to fizzle. Again,
in 1998, Tufts seemed to have found a partner in developing a massive hotel, office, and
research complex. [17] Although environmental difficulties slowed the project, as of
September 2004, the MBTA, Tufts, and its private development partner still hoped they
would see the project through. [18]
The Formalization of Expansion-Benefit Negotiation in the 1990s
In 1991, Rubel recalls, the BRA requested that Tufts create a new 20-year plan for the
institution in accordance with a plan the BRA had created the previous year for
Chinatown. She also asserts that it was the first time the BRA had asked an institution in
the area for such a document, but that others would follow. This new mandate for
institutions to create 20-year master plans for the BRA's approval was emblematic of the
agency's taking an even more aggressive role in long range planning for the future of the
neighborhood.
The BRA, then under the leadership of Stephen Coyle, made it clear that any future
expansion on the part of T-NEMC should be confined to commercial areas, avoid
residential areas, and provide significant community benefits. At the top of the BRA's
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agenda, as well as Chinatown's, was the creation of a new facility to replace the
dilapidated, cramped South Cove YMCA between Tyler and Hudson streets. Tufts, in
turn, wished to build a new research complex on its Posner parking lot, a large parcel
located between Harrison Avenue and Tyler Street.
By this time, an elected neighborhood group, the Chinatown Neighborhood Council, was
representing the Asian community in negotiations with Tufts. Other organizations like
Chinatown YES, the Chinese Progressive Association, and the BCNC, also chimed in.
The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association was no longer the primary voice of
the community, but since the CCBA had some legal right to the R-1 parcel that housed
the original YMCA, dating from the 1966 land use memoranda of understanding, it
remained involved in negotiations. Negotiating the master plan, which was completed in
1993, took four years. Maintaining a relationship with the community was many times
more difficult than in the days of the Seven-Man Committee; the number of community
groups had multiplied, each with a different agenda. The "Chinese community" was
finally recognized as not being a monolithic entity that a single voice could represent.
[14]
It was clear to the Tufts planning office that, if they didn't make a deal the community
approved, they receive no permit for their new research building. Hospital-community
negotiations led to a complex land deal. Tufts quickly agreed to build the new YMCA.
Originally, Tufts hoped to locate it within the research complex itself, but the CCBA
insisted on an offsite facility. Tufts, however, wanted the old YMCA's lot for itself, so
that its research locations would be contiguous. [14] In 1997, Tufts agreed to build a $2
million, four-story YMCA shell on a parcel between Harrison and Tyler streets (the
"Tyler" parcel), then serving as a parking lot. The university then swapped its Tyler
Street parcel for the city-owned P-2 parcel, located, like the Posner parking lot, between
Harrison Avenue and Tyler Street. In return, the BRA finally approved Tufts' 20-year
master plan, which included zoning for an additional 700,000 square feet of research and
classroom space. [14, 19] This version of the Tufts master plan saw the institution scale
back its dreams for expansion permanently. It finally sold the 193-5 and 203-5 Harrison
Avenue parcel - the infamous "Parcel C" - to the city for a project that would benefit the
Chinatown community: The Metropolitan, an affordable housing and nonprofit office
space complex. [14]
Later that year, the Chinatown Neighborhood Council (CNC) voted to endorse Tufts'
plans for a 147,000 square foot nutrition research center on Harrison Avenue. The new
YMCA had been a major bargaining chip, and the BRA had negotiated to keep the urban
design of the nutrition center palatable to the community. Incredibly, council member
Bill Moy is quoted as saying, "We feel like the university is being a good neighbor... this
will bring jobs to the community and a new YMCA." [20] The new Jaharis Family
Center for Biomedical and Nutrition Sciences opened in 2002. [21]
Serendipitously, in the mid-1990s, the owners of the Don Bosco Catholic high school,
located south of the old Metropolitan Theater parcel, decided to sell the building. Tufts
and the CNC agreed that the school would be the perfect site for the new YMCA. This
decision freed up the Tyler Street parcel for future building activity on T-NEMC's part.
[14]
The YMCA negotiations ended harmoniously. However, tensions had escalated earlier in
the decade over the aforementioned Parcel C, a piece of land that emerged again and
again as a point of contention since the 1960s. Bounded by Oak, Ash, Nassau, and
Harrison streets, it had been cleared of housing during the urban renewal era, and Tufts
had attempted to develop the parcel many times. Each time, community opposition had
stopped it. While T-NEMC still envisioned an 8-story parking garage as late as 1994, the
community was vociferously opposed to this project, despite T-NEMC's offer to donate
$1.8 million for a community center if allowed to build it. Community leaders were
concerned with both the environmental repercussions of a large parking garage and the
lost opportunity to build a community-oriented project on the site. [22] The parking
garage was never built, and Parcel C became The Metropolitan, a mixed-income housing
and office space development. Despite their victory, some Chinatown activists came
away from the battle with a lingering resentment of T-NEMC. According to community
lawyers Zenobia Lai et al, the Medical Center had inflamed the conflict by attempting to
build the garage after forging an agreement with the neighborhood not to. [2] The long
struggle over Parcel C represented both the continuing tension between hospital and
neighborhood, as well as the strength of the new reality that hospitals simply could no
longer build without support from their communities.
Contemporary T-NEMC: a Truce Founded on Common Interests
T-NEMC's acquisition of land back in the 1950s and 1960s was an extremely shrewd
maneuver. Even now, after it has returned some parcels to the community, it still has two
empty sites and one that could be used more intensively. If not for this land banking with
inherent development rights, it is questionable whether the Medical Center would ever be
allowed to build again. For their part, Chinatown neighborhood organizations are
continuing to function as developers. When the Turnpike Authority recently put out an
RFP for the development of the sliver of land between Hudson Street and what was once
the Central Artery ("Parcel 24"), ACDC responded. [14]
The hospital and neighborhood have found a venue in which they can work toward a
common interest Both T-NEMC and Chinatown residents have continued to be plagued
by street crime and violence spilling over from the Combat Zone and Theater District
area. T-NEMC increased the security of its buildings in response to both the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and staff concerns about homeless people from several nearby shelters wandering
into Tufts' buildings. Later, the institution's increased security became a point of tension
with Chinatown. Members of the community could no longer enter the buildings at will,
which made community functions in T-NEMC's facilities more cumbersome. Some




NEMC were suspicious of them. On the other hand, Tufts and Chinatown are working
together to foster public safety in the neighborhood. Barbara Rubel herself has acted as
secretary of the neighborhood Public Safety Committee for the last five years. Together,
the institution and the neighborhood pressed the Boston Police Department to install
security cameras on neighborhood streets. [14] Boston and MBTA police have
undertaken a very recent crackdown on crime in the area, patrolling it heavily. [23] Here,
Coser's theory of external conflict as a force of internal cohesion is manifested again; this
time, though, the hospital and the community lie on the same side of the conflict. [11]
All in all, Rubel reports that the strong hostility of the mid-1980s and earlier no longer
exists between T-NEMC and Chinatown. She says that the most negative attitude toward
the institutions is that the community wishes they weren't there, so that more affordable
housing could be built; after all, land is a painfully finite resource in Chinatown. [14] In a
newspaper article, Chinatown Neighborhood Council member Bill Moy confirmed this
view, stating that, while he would like to see all undeveloped parcels become affordable
housing, with limited federal and state funding, the neighborhood would realistically
have to consider other options that would bring community benefits with them. [20]
Lydia Lowe, head of the Chinese Progressive Association, offered a similar opinion in a
recent Boston Herald article: "I think the institutional needs of Tufts and the New
England Medical Center run counter to the community needs, for parkland and for
affordable housing." [24] As in the LMA, a fragile peace exists between the hospital and
neighborhood.
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Figure 8: The 1985-2005 power balance
The Role of Ongoing Community Benefits Provided by T-NEMC
The role of T-NEMC as a health care provider has changed dramatically over the years.
The magnitude of the discrepancy between the health care it provided the community in
1960 and the care it provides today is a subject of some dispute, however. When the
South Cove Community Health Center was first formed a few blocks from T-NEMC, its
doctors did not have admitting privileges to the Medical Center. Some even say that T-
NEMC's failure to provide health care to the community was the reason for the
Community Health Center's formation. [2] Some Chinatown advocates claim that even
today most Chinatown residents do not receive health care at T-NEMC, and that many
local residents had been turned away from the hospital in its early years. [2] Elliot
Rothman, on the other hand, remembers that even in the early 1960s, T-NEMC had a
Cantonese speaker on staff for emergency walk-ins. "There was never any dispute about
anybody in the community being denied or not getting the care they needed, as far as I
recall," Rothman says. [6] Despite conflicting memories of the era, it seems that T-
NEMC's performance as a community-serving health care provider was lacking.
The grassroots-focused political climate of the 1970s gave rise to a host of new
community benefit programs at T-NEMC. The dental school's Department of Social
Dentistry was established, in order to perform outreach and provide free dental service in
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underserved areas of the city. T-NEMC began to offer the use of its space to community
groups for classes and services. [12] As we saw earlier, however, some community
groups felt that Tufts was concentrating too much of its social service energy on far-flung
communities and not enough on the health care needs of its own neighbors.
Today, Tufts provides much of its in-kind community service through its students. Many
medical and dental students volunteer in a free clinic formerly housed in the Church of
All Nations, which serves the homeless and is located just southwest of T-NEMC. The
clinic has been forced to move, but it is still located on the MBTA's Orange Line in the
hope that Chinatown residents will be able to take advantage of it. Tufts provides
financial support for undergraduate who wish to undertake community service projects in
the area, as well. T-NEMC continues to give financial support to a number of Chinatown
initiatives like the "Healthy Chinatown" effort to bring organizations together to look at
the community holistically, supporting it after federal funds dried up. [14] T-NEMC as a
hospital, like many hospitals, provides extensive ongoing community benefits, which will
be discussed more extensively in Chapter Five.
T-NEMC Case Summary: Trends that Parallel the LMA's
The changes in T-NEMC's relationship with its surrounding community over time
essentially followed same pattern as the LMA's. At the end of the 1950s, the institutions
were the players holding nearly all power in the hospital-community-city triangle. The
BRA largely stayed out of T-NEMC's way when it wished to purchase land for
development, and the residential community had no vehicle by which to prevent the
hospital from doing what it wished with its own land. Beginning in the 1960s and
continuing through the 1970s, however, the BRA backed the Chinatown community
more and more in its struggles against T-NEMC. The BRA's reasons were a decline in
the financial rewards from supporting hospitals with the end of federal urban renewal
funding; a rise in the populist, grassroots neighborhood organizing movement that
conferred power to local communities; and the change in mayoral administrations that
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ushered in populist mayors John Collins and Kevin White. More and more, the hospital
was forced to consult the neighborhood when making planning and development
decisions.
Heightened hostilities accompanied these changes in the balance of power in the 1970s;
as the hospital came to accept the community's newfound strength, however, it began
listening more to community concerns and making substantial concessions alongside its
new development projects. In the 1980s, T-NEMC began to embrace the process of
proactively fostering a positive relationship with the community. It was not always
successful in pushing through its development plans, and when it was, it offered greater
and greater community benefits. Finally, by the 1990s, hostilities between the two entities
reached a low level. The hospital expansion-community benefits game had been played
often enough that the negotiation pattern accompanying it had become familiar to all the
players. T-NEMC and the community worked together on their common interest in
public safety. Today, although its neighbors do not love the institution, they have
accepted it as something they can live with and learned how to mitigate its effects.
It is interesting to note that the negotiation process between T-NEMC and its community
resembles that of Brigham and Women's Hospital (BWH) and differs from that of the
other Longwood institutions. Hospitals in the center of the LMA (e.g. Joslin Clinic and
Dana-Farber) simply present iterations of their plans at public meetings, listened to
community reactions, and incorporated comments into their design. In contrast, T-
NEMC's planners, like BWH's, have involved the community actively in sincere
dialogue about development decisions. One reason for this may be that T-NEMC and
BWH are located similarly with respect to their residential neighbors, abutting their
surrounding communities directly. The other Longwood hospitals do not. This physical
intimacy between hospital and neighborhood mandates more community representation
in decision making, because of the greater stake communities have in these hospitals.
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This greater interest in the actions of hospitals, of course, leads to the potential for more
bitter and intense conflict, which hospitals naturally seek to avoid.
Also of note is that the urban fabrics of T-NEMC and Chinatown are even more
interwoven than those of BWH and Mission Hill. A review of the two case studies
demonstrates that the area of great hostility between T-NEMC and Chinatown ended later
than it did for the Longwood Medical Area. As mentioned earlier, the manner in which
both areas abut their neighbors differs. Instead of having a clean, neat boundary like
Huntington Avenue between itself and residential areas, the medical center extends
irregularly to the east and south and has had a similar pattern in the past. This difference
in urban form could dictate the timing difference in hospital-community relations. With
only two case studies, however, it is impossible to make a solid claim of this nature.
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hospital community service programs
The benefits that the renowned teaching hospitals of this study provide their communities
are substantial - quantitatively, about 6 percent of their patient care expenditures. All
hospitals in Massachusetts provide at least some community benefits, but at first glance,
these academic research hospitals appear far more generous than most. I compared
typical community benefits programs of both types of hospital, in both dollars spent and
what they were spent on. I hoped that the comparison would lend me some insight into
which, if any, parts of hospitals' community service programs served as tools to reduce
community conflict and hostility.
Boston's Research Giants versus Massachusetts's Community Hospitals:
A Community Benefits Comparison
I was not the first to study the role hospitals play in their surrounding communities.
Hospital community benefit programs have come under particularly strict scrutiny in
Massachusetts. In 1993, the fact that many of the state's hospitals were operating
essentially as businesses came to the attention of state Attorney General Scott
Harshbarger. He began scrutinizing hospitals' practices to determine whether they were
serving their communities and carrying out a nonprofit mission worthy of their tax-free
status. Ultimately, the Attorney General's office did not mandate that Massachusetts
hospitals dedicate a specific percentage of the revenues for community benefits
programs. Beginning in 1994, however, hospitals have been required to file detailed
statements of their community service activities with the office to maintain their
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nonprofit status. The reports are updated every few years and contain data on
expenditures for community benefits as well as each hospital's priorities, strategies, and
successes. They are available on the Attorney General's Office websitel and constitute a
valuable record of how hospitals' service programs have changed over the years. [1]
Data is available for 47 non-profit hospitals and a single for-profit hospital in
Massachusetts. Benefit programs ranged from $370,270 (Nantucket Cottage Hospital) to
$78,000,000 (Massachusetts General Hospital) in FY 2003. Among the five hospitals
listed that belong to my study areas (Beth Israel-Deaconess, Brigham and Women's,
Children's, Dana-Farber, and Tufts-New England Medical Center2 ) the mean total annual
spending on community benefits is $26,079,790, and the median is $26,437,952.
Brigham and Women's had the highest expenditures of my group, at $42,800,000, and
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute had the lowest, at 11,416,412. This compares to a mean of
$9,078,969 and a median of $3,741,839 for all hospitals in Massachusetts. Thus, the
research and teaching hospitals in my study allocated far more dollars to community
benefits programs than the typical Massachusetts hospital.
As a percentage of overall patient care costs, the hospitals in my study areas also outspent
their counterparts in Massachusetts, although less dramatically. The average percent of
patient care dollars spent on community benefits for the LMA and T-NEMC hospitals is
6.50 percent, and the median is 5.59 percent. Dana-Farber was the highest spender in the
entire state percentage-wise, at 9.05 percent, and T-NEMC was the lowest, at 5.04
percent. This compares to a mean of 4.31 percent and a median of 3.93 percent among
hospitals statewide. South Shore Hospital was the lowest spender in terms of percentages
at 0.20 percent of patient care expenses. The less dramatic difference between the
1http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid=965
2 The Joslin Diabetes Center is not considered a hospital and was not required to submit a community
benefits report to the Attorney General's Office.
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teaching hospitals and Massachusetts hospitals in general in this category indicates that
the teaching hospitals tend to have larger operations budgets.
The initial question appears intriguing: Why do major research and teaching hospitals
spend more resources on community benefits than do smaller community hospitals, both
in gross terms and as a percentage of patient care expenses? At first, this might seem
counter-intuitive; after all, the very mission of community hospitals is to serve the health
care needs of the populations that surround them. Health care delivery is just one part of
the research and teaching hospital mission; these institutions add contributing to the
medical world by conducting research, training physicians, and providing complex
treatments to far-flung patients with unusual conditions to their missions. One could then
argue that the large percentage of their budget research and teaching hospitals spend on
community benefits programs is convincing evidence of the tradeoffs between the
institutional expansion sought by these hospitals and community desires.
There may be many other reasons for greater community benefit levels among research
institutions, however. The Dana-Farber Cancer Institute's Anne Levine gives two reasons
that her employer leads the state in percentage of patient care expenses devoted to
community benefits: first, that half of the institute's budget is devoted to research, "so
that's taken out of the denominator"; and second, that millions of dollars of grants every
year go to funding research on various community cancer-prevention initiatives, which
are included in community benefit figures. It makes sense that, given the many different
sources of funding received by research hospitals, it may be more financially feasible for
them to take on large community benefits programs. Simply put, the discrepancy in
community benefit levels could merely be an issue of accounting. [2]
Despite the ambitious and multi-faceted goals of research institutions, they can be deeply
committed to their community programs. Beth Israel-Deaconess Medical Center
(BIDMC) in the LMA provides an interesting counterpoint. The hospital faced a financial
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crisis at the beginning of this decade. According to Ediss Gandelman, director of
community benefits for BIDMC, she and Paul Levy, the newly hired CEO, were
determined to maintain the benefits they provided Boston communities even during a
painful restructuring beginning in 2002. When a "slash-and-burn" consultant group
recommended the hospital sever its ties to the seven Community Health Centers it
supported, Gandelman reports that the hospital maintained its commitment to them, even
while laying off over 600 employees. Gandelman reports that philanthropic donations
unrelated to health care are more likely to be cut in tough economic times than health
care provision itself. [3]
To determine whether economies of scale play a part in teaching hospitals' relative
generosity, I plotted total patient care spending versus the percentage going to
community benefits for all hospitals in Massachusetts for which there is data. I found a
correlation between total spending and percentage spent on benefits, but it is very weak,
with an R2 of just 0.15. Thus, the large size of T-NEMC and the hospitals of the LMA
does little to explain the size of their benefits programs; their association with educational
and research institutions could be more relevant. This institutional wealth gives hospitals
the power to buy peace with their surrounding communities, as when Harvard showered
Roxbury Tenants of Harvard with land in order to win the organization's approval of the
Brigham and Women's expansion across Francis Street. Institutional deep pockets also
give community groups power; knowing that the hospitals can access great financial
resources gives the organizations a bargaining chip with which to ask for great benefits.
In The Uses of Disorder, Richard Sennett musters the argument that affluence in general
encourages inter-group conflict. In his view, societal affluence provides a "floor" to
conflict; it serves as financial padding so that one party may lose a conflict without being
decimated. In an affluent world, conflict is not a bitter, life-and-death struggle, so that





Hospitals may have their financial ups and downs, but a great deal of money flows
through the health care system. With diverse funding sources to draw from in the 1960s,
hospitals could easily be seen as affluent parties to their conflicts with neighbors.
Sennet's point begs the following questions: Do research hospitals give away greater
benefits because of the conflict with their communities? Or do communities incite
conflict because hospitals have the affluence to afford greater benefits? Although this
thesis assumes the former, the directionality of the conflict-benefit relationship is
certainly a question worth thinking about.
The Role of "Soft" and "Hard" Benefits
The benefit programs in the reports filed with the Attorney General's Office go far
beyond the fruits of the negotiations at the heart of this research. Likewise, some
negotiated benefits are not included in the reports. For example, recall that Harvard's
most recent deal with Roxbury Tenants of Harvard involved Harvard both turning over
land deeds to the nonprofit as well as pledging financial support for its operations. While
the financial support to a local organization would be included in the institution's
community benefits report, the land swaps, although they were greatly to the
community's benefit, would not be. These gaps would seem to indicate a lack of direct
nexus between hospitals' direct community service programs and their expansion
agendas.
The community benefit priority areas of each hospital, which must be reported to the
Attorney General's Office alongside individual programs, represent a diverse collection
of health care issues. Beth Israel's priorities are to improve access to health care in the
community through its seven affiliated health centers; to improve access to health care in
the hospital through respect and communication; and to reduce and eliminate racial and
ethnic disparities in health care. [5] Brigham and Women's Hospital has focused on
improving health-care access for low-income women and their families, particularly in
the Mission Hill, Jamaica Plain, Roxbury, and Dorchester neighborhoods of Boston.
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Children's Hospital of Boston focuses on injury prevention, childhood asthma, and
access to health care and mental health services for at-risk Boston children. The Dana-
Farber Cancer Institute's community outreach mission is to prevent cancer and AIDS in
at-risk and underserved populations in Massachusetts; serve as a consultant on cancer-
related matters to Boston's community health providers; and raise the number of
minorities participating in clinical trials. The Joslin Center for Diabetes has partnered
with community health centers for diabetes outreach projects. Finally, Tufts-New
England Medical Center works to improve access to healthcare and provide culturally
and linguistically appropriate health outreach and education services to Boston's Asian
community, especially its harder to reach segments. [6]
The role of soft benefits in hospital-community relations, and especially in negotiations
between the two parties, is unclear. Typically, they appear in land use negotiations only
as ongoing cash grants promised to neighborhood nonprofits. As David Eppstein and
Sarah Griffen both pointed out, the ongoing benefits programs get very little press, since
they are not news events in the same way that a new community center or a multi-
million-dollar land swap are. Since they target specific and often small populations,
community members' awareness of them varies. Hospital administrators tend to agree
that their health care-related community work helps to build positive relationships with
neighborhood groups, which can sometimes establish a more positive tone at community
meetings. They tend to deny that ongoing "soft" benefits have a significant impact on
hospital-community negotiations, however.
The explanation for the lesser significance of "soft" benefits in negotiating expansion
need not be complex. I began this research with the perhaps naive view that the special
benefits hospitals as institutions could provide - health care services and stable
employment - would play a significant role in hospital expansion/community benefit
negotiations. I expected these special benefits to make hospitals' negotiations with their
surrounding communities and the city unique among urban institutions. In retrospect,
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however, it makes perfect sense that these negotiations are essentially about land and
money, both very tangible elements of power. Promises to enact health care or jobs
programs can easily be broken or forgotten; checks cannot be unwritten, nor can deeds be
un-transferred. It is also a reasonable expectation of communities that hospitals provide
health care and jobs to their members simply in the day-to-day course of business. After
all, that is what hospitals do. Therefore, the community benefits for extraordinary events
like major expansions must likewise be extraordinary and outside of the realm of what
hospitals typically provide. Finally, it is no surprise that community groups with to
control their own destiny. This may be the most compelling reason of all for the
preeminence of land and cash over "soft" benefits, as impressive and far-reaching as they
may be. Given the promise of community service programs, neighborhood groups only
gain the power to wait and watch as the hospitals enact the programs. Given money or
land, the same groups are vested with the power of leveraging their resources in whatever
way they feel the community's interest lies. Health care services provided by a hospital
are a great benefit, but community empowerment lies in implementing benefits programs
oneself.
103
1. Knox, R.A., AG delays spending guide for hospitals; specific dollar amounts had
been vigorously opposed, in Boston Globe. 1994: Boston. p. 15.
2. Levine, A., Interview, K. Solheim, Editor. 2005: Via telephone.
3. Gandelman, E., Interview, K. Solheim, Editor. 2005: Boston.
4. Sennett, R., The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life. 1970, New
York: Knopf.
5. Gandleman, E., Interview, K. Solheim, Editor. 2005: Boston.
6. Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General, Hospital and HMO Annual




Forty-Five Years of Changing Hospital-Community Relations
In both case studies examined in this report, hospital-community relations evolved
greatly over the 45 years from the beginning of urban renewal to the present, and this
evolution showed a strikingly similar pattern in both cases. Federal legislation; the
macroeconomy; the health care economy; municipal administrations; and social trends all
played a similar role in shaping hospital-community relations.
On the national level, urban renewal legislation gave hospitals, along with other
institutions, great financial advantages for expansion projects. Urban renewal legislation
enacted in 1949 to funnel money to blighted areas of cities was amended in 1961 to
include hospitals as beneficiaries. [1] National Institute of Health funding for biomedical
research had also grown immensely by the mid-1960s. [2] Urban renewal funding
proceeded to trail off by the mid-1970s, and the power of research money was also
diminished. The great Federal expenditures on the 1950s and 1960s on urban renewal
have never been matched.
Meanwhile, the city's economy was very weak by the 1950s, leading to a municipal zest
for urban renewal projects. Boston saw something of an economic recovery in the
following decade, and the construction of the Prudential Center in 1965 set off a building
boom in downtown office space. By 1970, Boston was flourishing relative to 20 years
earlier. National recessions in the mid-1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s, and the turn of
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this century affected Boston negatively as well, but with its ever-present base of well-
educated workers, Boston's economy is strong today. [3]
The health care economy followed a similar pattern of peaks and valleys but differed
somewhat in its timing. While Boston's economy as a whole was gaining momentum into
the 1970s, research hospitals were seeing their urban renewal and research funding
diminish. On the other hand, they saw their fortunes grow during biotechnology booms at
the end of the 1980s and 1990s (and continuing today). [2]
The election of Mayor John Collins in 1960 was the first in a streak of populist mayors
that continued with Kevin White and Ray Flynn. In sync with national trends, through
their BRA appointees, these mayors influenced planning in Boston such that
neighborhood concerns played a large part in determining whether projects were
approved. Mayor Tom Menino continues to place a priority on neighborhood issues like
affordable housing and consistent urban design today.
Taken in sum, the result of these long-term shifts in hospitals' macroenvironments is a
shift in hospitals' political power relative to communities and the city, as well as a shift in
the various alliances among the three parties. These relationship shifts can be
demonstrated via the series of circular diagrams we saw in earlier chapters.
city Figure 9: Before 1965, hospitals
were primarily limited in their
expansion only by the real estate
Neighborhood market, and even that limitation
was eased by generous urban




Figure 10: 1965 was a watershed City
year for planning in Boston. The
South Cove Urban Renewal Plan
was published, giving T-NEMC
the first formal pushback against Neighborhood
Political
movements of the 1960s were
flourishing, and grassroots community groups began to form to advocate for their own
interests. Between 1965 and 1970, the neighborhoods gained power and, with a friendly
mayoral administration, forged closer ties with the BRA.
City Figure 11: During the
contentious struggles of the
1970s, the balance of power
between the hospitals and
Political neighborhood interests gradually
Hospital Power Neighborhood evened out as both sides tested
the other's strength in heady
clashes. While hospitals and
neighborhoods did make some
effort to communicate, there was no terribly workable system in place to do so.
Figure 12: Around 1985, hospitals and Cfty
communities began to take on shared
projects in the self-interest of both Political
parties and develop more effective Power
communications. The BRA emerged as
the major political power during this
time, as it arbitrated between hospitals Hospital Neighborhood
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and neighborhoods and had the final word.
Forces that Drive Hospital-Community Negotiations
Health care missions. In contrast with the results I expected, the fact that these
institutions are hospitals and provide health care in actuality has very little bearing on
their negotiations over expansion. As shown in Chapter Five, as health care institutions,
they have much to offer the communities that surround them; however, services like
providing well-paying jobs and delivering health care were very seldom used as
bargaining chips. Instead, negotiations around expansion almost exclusively focused on
land and cash - the same bargaining tools any large institution would use. In Chapter
Five, I hypothesized three reasons that these traditional manifestations of power - land
and money - so overwhelmingly surpassed hospitals' services in negotiations:
1) The transfer of land or funds is a more permanent transaction than the promise of
service delivery and cannot be reneged as easily.
2) Health care and jobs are simply services expected from hospitals and not viewed
as extraordinary benefits.
3) Finally, the transfer of land or money gives communities control over the
programs and activities they think would best help their communities; they have
autonomy over projects and are not limited to the services that hospitals can
provide.
When the health care mission did play a role in negotiations, it did so because the BRA
took into account hospitals' service mission and importance to Boston's economy to
make sure that planning restrictions on them were not so strict as to severely stunt their
functionality. The health care services provided by hospitals played a much more subtle
role in hospitality-community relations, maintaining an undercurrent of goodwill, such as
it was, that had the potential to tone down hostilities at public and private meetings.
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Urban form. The relationships and negotiations between the various hospitals in this
study and their surrounding communities differ subtly from one another. A predictor of
these differences is a hospital's physical form. T-NEMC, for example, is intimately
woven into the fine-grained urban fabric of Chinatown, while the LMA stands as its own
neighborhood, sharply bounded from residential neighborhoods by Huntington Avenue,
Francis Street (currently, at least), the Fenway, and the Riverway. Alone in the LMA,
Brigham and Women's Hospital (BWH) abuts its residential neighbors.
It is beyond the scope of this research to demonstrate a difference in the level of
community benefits provided by different hospital locations with respect to the
community. From examining the data, however, hospital location does seem to affect the
way in which benefits are negotiated and community relationships themselves.
Administrators from several of the interior Longwood institutions told me that they did
not negotiate their development plans with community organizations per se; instead, they
presented several iterations of expansion designs at community meetings organized by
MASCO and the BRA, listened to community feedback, and incorporated it into their
plans until the BRA was satisfied. [4] [5] In contrast, T-NEMC and BWH administrators
have sat down at the table with community leaders and hammered out negotiations
directly. [6] [7]
That communities would insist that their direct abutters negotiate more intimately with
them is to be expected. The Fenway has a stake in what the Joslin Center does; increased
shadow, congestion, environmental impacts, and parking pressure could all affect the
neighborhood. However, if BWH built a residential tower directly across the street from
Mission Hill, for example, the tower's proximity would magnify these effects. Even the
interface between hospital and community may have an effect on their relationship. It is
notable that T-NEMC employees are forced to be involved even in the day-to-day work
of community organizers, as evidenced by Barbara Rubel's work on Chinatown's
neighborhood safety committee. [7] Perhaps this is because of T-NEMC's blending
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physically with the neighborhood, while even the abutting BWH is separated by clean
barriers from Mission Hill.
Ritual gleaned from conflict. It is striking how negotiations between hospitals and
community groups have taken on a ritualistic form in recent decades. Both sides know
the game of expansion negotiation very well; yet some degree of community outrage is
necessary for the game to begin. It has morphed from an emotional David-and-Goliath
showdown into a public deliberation between two more equal parties. Instead of fighting
all institutional expansion tooth and nail, neighborhood groups have resigned themselves
to the fact that some will happen no matter how strong their desires to maintain the status
quo are. They have turned their attention to making sure that they get their allotted
benefits out of any new construction. The case of Beth Israel-Deaconess's purchase of the
MassArt building is an example of this. While the neighborhood raised some objections
to the transaction, no serious consideration of other uses was made. The neighbors were
primarily focused on the bottom line: what community benefits would come out of the
deal? The transaction happened; Beth Israel-Deaconess expanded; and the community did
indeed receive significant benefits.
Underlying this ritual is the potential for conflict if the hospitals were to cease playing by
the rules that have been developed for expansion negotiation over the last 45 years. There
are still plenty of residents who were active during the conflict-ridden 1960s and 1970s in
the neighborhoods, and they remember the widespread resentment against the teaching
hospitals. Suppose that an LMA hospital or T-NEMC began to once again purchase land
across the agreed-upon boundary between hospital and neighborhood and go full-speed-
ahead with expansion plans, bypassing the typical neighborhood consultation process.
The result would be a public relations and regulatory disaster. The neighborhood could
quickly start the machinery of an all-out protest and cause grave harm to the institution.
While hospitals feel good about maintaining positive relations with the neighborhoods
because it's the right thing to do, they also know that they have no other choice. A tacit
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threat underlies the cordial relationship between hospitals and their neighbors, although
the conflict has become domesticated. This disincentive on both sides to escalate conflict
too much is an interurban, small-scale version of the political theory of mutually assured
destruction.
Lessons for Practice
The primary lesson to glean from this research is how very critical it is to an institution's
enlightened self-interest to establish a relationship with any nearby residential
communities. If serious conflict does develop, institutions should be prepared to negotiate
with more than in-kind benefits on the table. Ignoring a neighborhood's concerns or
animosity and pretending they don't exist will yield poor results for a hospital. Trying to
force expansion plans through via financial or political strength without a community's
approval (or the closest possible version thereof) is often also ineffective.
It is difficult to predict what the future holds for hospital-community relations. One thing
is certain: if the fluctuations of the past 45 years are any model, they will continue to
evolve with changing times. Given the multitude of factors we have seen affect hospital-
community-city negotiations - national policy, the general economy, trends in health
care, and local politics - predicting future trends becomes a multi-faceted guessing game.
Perhaps the most noticeable current trend in any of these areas is a rapid change in
Boston's demographics. As real estate prices in Boston show no signs of ceasing to rise,
formerly low-income or mixed-income neighborhoods have become desirable homes for
affluent professionals. Although Chinatown and Mission Hill have not been overly
gentrified yet, such a change is not outside the realm of possibility. A recent newspaper
noted skyrocketing real estate values in Mission Hill, known for generations variably as
either a solidly working-class or outright bad neighborhood. [8] If a new population of
gentrifiers gains political power in a neighborhood like Chinatown or Mission Hill, they
may have very different goals with respect to local hospitals. The construction and
preservation of low-income housing (along with low-income health care) may be less of a
I1
pressing issue. For a more transient population, construction that is on a much larger
scale than the rest of the neighborhood or changes its character may also cease to be
cause for concern, since they view it as less of a permanent home. It is logical to assume
that the power equilibrium between hospital and community reaches a new resting place
when the residents on the border change. Paradoxically, while new, more affluent, and
more enfranchised residents may wield more political power as a group, if they cease to
fight for today's most cherished neighborhood causes, the balance of power may tip once
again in favor of the hospitals.
Potential Directions for Future Research
The important component of race in hospital-community relations and institution-
community relations in general was beyond the scope of this paper; yet it remains
important to address. Both of the neighborhoods most negatively affected by hospital
expansion, Chinatown and Mission Hill, are predominantly or significantly nonwhite.
The population of Chinatown is mainly Asian-American, and a large proportion of
Mission Hill residents are African-American, although at the time of urban renewal, its
population was predominantly Irish-American.
This study has focused on the conflict of interest between community groups and
hospitals, presenting the struggle between them in economic terms. I have not addressed
at length additional issues that arise from the differences in culture between mainly white,
professional hospital administrators and working-class communities of color, and how
these cultural differences affect negotiations. It would be especially interesting to
determine whether a parallel exists between the hospital-community and doctor-patient
relationship, both of which have been criticized for inappropriate wielding of privilege on
the part of the former parties.
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